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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although nothing is certain in Washington, sweeping federal legislation 
in the cigarette area is more likely now than has ever been the case. 1 
Congress is currently considering several proposals for comprehensive 
federal regulation of the cigarette market, 2 a market that has until now gone 
largely untouched by government intervention. 3 Among those proposals, the 
one that has received the most attention, and the one that in fact motivated 
policy makers to look anew at the problems posed by cigarettes, is the 
proposed national tobacco resolution (the "Proposed Resolution").4 The 
Proposed Resolution, which has been advanced by a coalition of state 
attorneys general and tobacco companies, would grant cigarette 
manufacturers immunity from all class action and attorney general lawsuits 
and punitive damages for past harms in exchange for changes in FDA 
regulatory authority, limitations on advertising by tobacco companies, and 
$368.5 billion in payouts over 25 years .5 
In a recent artide in the Yale Law Journal, two of us (Hanson and 
Logue) made three general arguments regarding the cigarette market.6 First, 
we argued that the market for cigarettes is characterized by severe market 
failures and hence is in need of extensive government regulation. 7 Given 
that the current debate in Washington assumes the need for some type of 
government action in the cigarette area, we will not restate those market 
failures here. Instead, we will say only this : In light of evidence that 
smokers typically begin smoking at a very early age, 8 tend to underestimate 
the long-term health risks to themselves (and to others) of smoking,9 often 
underestimate the addictiveness of cigarettes, 10 and do not bear many of the 
I. 
2. 
See Jeffrey Taylor & B rian Duffy, Bipartisan Bill Over Tobacco Is in the Works, WA LL ST. J. , Feb. 
27, 1998, at A3. 
Id. 
3. Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post 
Incentive-Based Regulation, 108 YA LE L.J. 1162 ( 1998). 
4. Proposed Resolution: For Settlement Discussion Purposes Only 6120/97 (on file with authors). 
S. For a more complete description of the Proposed Resolution and its likely effects, see Hanson & 
L ogue, supra note 3, at 1316-48. 
6. Hanson & L ogue, supra note 3. 
7. Id. at 1181-1262. 
8. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 4, at 1. 
· 9. See Hanson & L ogue, supra note 3, at 1186-93. 
10. See id. at 1193-1221. 
522 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 22 
costs associated with their own smoking, 1 1  we agree that the market for 
cigarettes should not be left unregulated. 
Second, we argued that, from a deterrence perspective, the most 
promising type of regulation in the cigarette context is some form of ex post 
incentive-based regulation-regulation that imposes the costs of smoking on 
cigarette manufacturers as those costs arise, giving manufacturers incentives 
to make cost-justifiably safer cigarettes and forcing cigarette pricing to 
reflect the social costs of smoking. 12 
Finally, we described how the Proposed Resolution takes just the wrong 
approach, completely rejecting ex post incentive-based regulation and instead 
expanding the use of other regulatory approaches (mainly command-and­
control provisions) that have proven to be-and are widely regarded by 
regulatory experts as being-inferior to incentive-based regulatory 
approaches .  1 3  
In  this article, we elaborate on one type of ex post incentive-based 
regulation that was briefly outlined in the Yale article . 14 It is a regime that 
we call Smokers' Compensation. 15 The principal goals of the regime would 
be: (a) to exploit, rather than be exploited by, the informational advantage 
that cigarette manufacturers have regarding the risks posed by their products; 
(b) to force cigarette manufacturers, and hence cigarette consumers through 
the price mechanism, to ta�e into account more of the social costs of 
cigarettes than they currently do; (c) to create incentives for cigarette 
companies to make safer cigarettes, indeed to compete with respect to 
cigarette safety; (d) to establish a separate insurance pool for smoking-related 
harms that is financed by smokers through the price of cigarettes, thereby 
reducing nonsmokers' insurance premiums and taxes;16 and (e) to do all of 
those things without producing administrative costs that outweigh the benefits 
of the regime. 
11. See id. at 1223-32. 
12. See id. at 1263-1315. 
13. See id. at 1316-48. 
14. See id. at 1283-1315. 
I 5. We use the tenn "Smokers' Compensation" to emphasize the kinship between our proposed regime 
and perhaps the most prominent existing example of a causation-based, no-fault compensation 
regime-namely, workers' compensation. We should emphasize, however, a key difference 
between Smokers' Compensation and existing causation-based, no-fault regimes: The principal, 
though not necessarily the sole, goal of Smokers' Compensation is deterrence, not compensation. 
16. Establishing a separate insurance pool for smoking harms would remove those costs from existing 
public and private health-insurance pools, insofar as smokers currently have insurance against 
smoking-caused harms. Such segregation means lower premiums or taxes for nonsmokers and fills 
any gaps in existing insurance arrangements to the extent smokers are currently without coverage 
for smoking-related losses. 
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Before undertaking this examination, however, a word of caution is in 
oraer. This is not an exercise in legislative drafting. It is instead a starting 
point for someone who has been given the task of drafting legislation or 
creating regulations in this area and who is serious about correcting the 
failures in the cigarette market in a way that stands a chance of achieving the 
five goals mentioned above. Although we will discuss how a Smokers' 
Compensation regime might be designed, we will still speak in general terms 
and necessarily omit many details. This Article is also not intended to be a 
neat, theoretically impermeable treatment of the questions of tobacco 
regulation. The proposals herein are offered with an eye towards political 
viability. As such, many details necessarily must be deferred to 
policymakers who are in a position to evaluate the real world implications of 
the costs and benefits. At the very least, the Article aims to identify many 
of the issues that should be the focus of any effort to construct a workable ex 
post incentive-based regime. 
Part II defines some key terms and briefly summarizes the basic case 
for ex post incentive-based regulation over its alternatives. That Part also 
briefly summarizes the problems with the Proposed Resolution. Part III 
offers an introduction to the Smokers' Compensation idea. It presents a 
decision-making framework in which to consider the subsequent proposals , 
namely the inevitable tradeoff between accuracy and cost. Part III also 
examines other existing and proposed alternative compensation systems that 
might serve to guide development of a Smokers' Compensation system. Part 
N describes our blueprint for a Smokers' Compensation regime and surveys 
the questions that must be addressed in order to implement such a regime. 
In that Part, we look at the accuracy-cost alternatives implicit in various 
answers to the primary questions of system design: who is the decision­
maker? ; who should be eligible to bring claims?; what damages should 
claimants be entitled to?; how should claimants prove a smoking-related 
injury?; and how would compensation costs be allocated among cigarette 
manufacturers? Finally, in Part V we touch on a number of potential 
administrative and political difficulties in constructing a viable Smokers' 
Compensation system. 
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II. THE CASE FOR EX POST INCENTIVE-BASED CIGARETTE 
REGULATION17 
A. Three Categories of Regulation 
When comparing and contrasting various regulatory regimes, scholars 
often divide the world of regulation into three general types: command-and­
control regulation; peiformance-based regulation; and incentive-based 
regulation. 18 The distinctions among these three categories are not perfect. 
Thus, some examples of command-and-control regulation begin to shade into 
performance-based regulation; and some examples of performance-based 
regulation begin to look like incentive-based regulation. In fact, it is 
probably most accurate to understand the three categories as three points 
along a continuum, with command-and-control regulation at one end, 
incentive-based regulation at the other end, and performance-based 
regulation somewhere in the middle. Nevertheless , it is useful to maintain 
the conceptual distinctions among the three types of regulation to enable us 
to identify the costs and benefits of moving in one direction or the other 
along the continuum. 
Under command-and-control regulation, sometimes called "input 
regulation, " the regulator imposes specific requirements on the firm. The 
regulator in effect tells the regulated firm how specifically to run some aspect 
of its business . In regulating pollution, for example, .  the command-and­
control regulator might prescribe specific steps that manufacturers must take, 
or specific technologies that they must use, to reduce the level of pollution 
that is emitted by their manufacturing processes. 19 
Under peiformance-based regulation, by contrast, the regulator presents 
manufacturers with a target of some sort, which the manufacturers are 
17. This Part draws on and summarizes the analysis in Hanson & L ogue, supra note 3, at 1173-78, 
1263-81. 
18. See generally Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1173-78, 1263-81 (defining and comparing these 
various forms of regulation and summarizing the literature regarding the scholarly consensus in 
favor of incentive-based regulation). 
19. There are many examples of command-and-control regulation in the Proposed Resolution. For 
example, the warning requirements and the advertising restrictions that the Proposed Resolution. 
would impose on manufacturers are best characterized as command-and-control regulations. 
Similarly, if the FDA exercised its limited authority under the Proposed Resolution to mandate 
particular "technologically feasible," "less hazardous tobacco products," it would do so in the form 
of command-and-control regulations. Proposed Resolution, supra note 4, at 14. 
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encouraged to meet. That target is sometimes called a "performance 
standard. "  The manufacturers are then left to decide how best to achieve the 
target. One performance standard, for example, might be a maximum 
quantity of pollution that a firm is allowed to emit over a given period of 
time, such as that allowed by tradable pollution permits. Failure to achieve 
the relevant target, however, would result in a fine or additional regulation.20 
Although there is something to be said for performance-based 
regulation over command-and-control regulation, 21 both impose roughly the 
same informational demands on the regulator. Performance-based regulation, 
when compared to command-and-control regulation, reflects a greater degree 
of humility and skepticism with regard to how much the regulator can be 
expected to know about the cutting-edge technology in a given industry. It 
relies on the industry's (or the market's) information to_a greater extent than 
command-and-control regulation. Nevertheless, both types of regulation 
make substantial informational demands on the regulator. To see why this 
is so, consider the following question: How is the performance-based 
regulator to choose the appropriate target level of performance or the 
appropriate fine for failing to meet that target? For example, how does 
Congress or the EPA determine the aggregate level of air or water pollution 
to permit? To answer such questions the regulator must have information 
about not only the level of harm caused by different levels of pollution but 
also the total social costs and benefits of both the activities that give rise to 
the pollution and the potential solutions . 
Incentive-based regulation is superior to command-and-control and 
performance-based approaches because it requires less information of the 
regulator, and because it relies more on the market to generate the desired 
regulatory outcomes, than the other two approaches do. Under incentive­
based regulation, the regulator simply forces the manufacturers to pay the 
total costs of their manufacturing activities. The manufacturers are then left 
to decide what to do about those costs, if anything. Thus, incentive-based 
regulation does not, in any way, tell manufacturers how to run their business. 
(as command-and-control regulation does) . Nor does it require the regulator 
20. The Proposed Resolution contains a couple of perfonnance-based standards. The best known 
example is the so-called "look-back" provision, which would set target levels of underage smoking 
that the industry would pay a fine for failing to meet. 
21. If there is a performance standard or target that is assumed to be desirable, performance-based 
regulation can be superior to command-and-control regulation as a means of achieving that standard, 
for the reason already described-manufacturers have better infonnation. In addition, if we know 
what the target standard is, then enforcement of such a standard is relatively easy (because of the 
ease of monitoring compliance) compared to enforcement of command-and-control regulation, 
where the regulator must constantly defer to the infonnational advantage of the manufacturer. 
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to choose the ideal regulatory target (as performance-based regulation does) . 
It simply makes the industry pay its costs, and lets the market sort things out. 
The general superiority of incentive-based regulation over command-and­
control regulation in most settings is commonly accepted among efficiency­
oriented scholars and is increasingly recognized by policy makers .22 Indeed, 
most of the important debates in environmental regulation seem not to be 
over whether to use market forces, but how best to use market forces as a 
means of reducing pollution. 
B. Ex Post vs. Ex Ante Incentive-Based Regulation 
Consider one additional definitional distinction: the distinction between 
"ex ante" and "ex post" incentive-based regulation. Under ex post 
incentive-based regulation, as we define the term, the regulator waits until 
after the harm occurs and then imposes the costs of that harm on the 
particular manufacturer responsible for it. Thus the manufacturer, in making 
its initial production decisions ex ante, will anticipate the possibility of such 
ex post liability and will take into account the expected value of those 
liability costs in deciding how much to invest in improving the safety of its 
cigarettes and in deciding how much to charge consumers for its brand of 
cigarettes . Under current law, we have a form of ex post incentive-based 
regulation: tort law or products liability law. 
Ex ante incentive-based regulation, on the other hand, tries to impose 
those same expected accident costs on manufacturers before the harms 
actually occur. The typical example of this type of regulation would be an 
excise tax imposed on cigarettes. What is interesting is that the excise tax 
seems to be the preferred form of regulation among most economists . 
Indeed, among the economists writing about cigarettes, it seems to be the 
only regulatory tool that is given serious consideration. Why do economists 
have this preference for excise taxes? It is because a tax supposedly requires 
less information on the part of the regulator than command-and-control or 
performance-based regulation does. 23 Again, the idea is that the regulator 
can just measure harm and impose it on the manufacturer. 
There are two general reasons why ex ante incentive-based regulation 
is inferior to the ex post version, especially in the cigarette context. First, 
choosing the appropriate rate of tax requires the regulator (as in the case of 
command-and-control and performance-based regulation) to have an 
22. See Hanson & L ogue, supra note 3, at 1174-75. 
23. See id. at 1268. 
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enormous amount of information up front (at the time the tax rate is set) 
about the costs and benefits of cigarettes, including the costs and benefits of 
alternative cigarette designs. In contrast, under an ex post regime, costs 
would be imposed on cigarette manufacturers only as the external harms 
caused by cigarettes actually became manifest. Thus, although the regulator 
would be responsible for sorting out after the fact what harms had been 
caused by cigarettes and should be charged to manufacturers, it would be the 
cigarette manufacturers who would decide up front how to make and market 
cigarettes to minimize those costs. 
Second, an excise tax, unlike an ex post approach, does not create 
incentives for cigarette manufacturers to compete over safety. This is a very 
basic point, but it is central to the argument for an ex post regime and to our 
critique of the Proposed Resolution. 24 At best, an excise tax would impose 
on each manufacturer the average per pack external costs for the whole 
industry. Such a tax, however, provides no incentive for manufacturers to 
make investments in developing and manufacturing safer cigarette designs 
(such as nicotine-free cigarettes or low-carcinogen cigarettes) or in 
identifying relatively low-risk smokers (people who are least likely to suffer 
harmful effects from smoking) . Any such innovations would cost a 
manufacturer money-research and development costs among others-but 
would provide essentially zero benefit to that manufacturer given that the 
taxes are fixed (or, if variable, are assessed on a market share basis). 
If the taxes are fixed, then, of course, nothing that a manufacturer does 
can lower them. Even if the taxes vary to reflect the changes in the average 
costs imposed by cigarettes, however, manufacturers will not invest to lower 
those costs , because the benefit of such investments would be shared with the 
whole industry in the form of a reduced industry-wide excise tax. Again, 
each manufacturer would have a strong incentive to make no such safety­
enhancing investments. This phenomenon is a special case of what policy 
scholars call the "common pool" or "free rider" problem. We sometimes 
refer to it as the "unraveling problem,"  because, under such a scenario, the 
market for safety improvements may unravel, as each manufacturer realizes 
that making investments in safety enhancements is not in their financial best 
interest. 
We should emphasize that our position is not that command-and­
control , performance-based regulation, and excise taxes should never be 
used. In some non-cigarette situations (for example, in dealing with the 
problems of air pollution created by automo,bile emissions), command-and-
24. See infra Part 11.C. 
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control or performance-based regulation, or perhaps an excise tax, may be 
the only available options. This would be true if ex post incentive-based 
regulation (of the type we describe in greater detail in this Article) were 
considered impractical, perhaps because the harms associated with 
generalized air pollution are too widely dispersed to give rise to ex post 
damage claims brought by individual victims. It should be emphasized, 
however, that the cigarette market presents a setting in which ex post 
incentive-based regulation is available as a regulatory option. Therefore, 
those types of regulations are not viable substitutes for ex post incentive­
based regulation of the cigarette market, for the reasons already discussed. 
Still, even in the cigarette context, command-and-control and performance­
based regulation might be useful complements to an ex post incentive-based 
regime, for example, as additional means of reducing underage smoking.25 
C .  Some Problems with the Proposed Resolution 
Given the consensus in favor of incentive-based (and against command­
and-control) regulation, one would hope that any proposal to regulate 
cigarettes would rely most heavily on incentive-based approaches, with little 
emphasis on command-and-control and performance-based regulation. In 
fact, the Proposed Resolution takes just the opposite approach. It is 
dominated by a renewed and strengthened emphasis on command-and-control 
regulation, including everything from new warning requirements26 to new 
FDA control over the level of nicotine27 and other ingredients28 in tobacco 
products . In addition, the settlement contains the occasional performance­
based approach-such as the "look back" provision designed to achieve 
specific targets of underage smoking by various points in time29 -but those 
provisions, by virtually all accounts, involve penalties for failure to achieve 
the relevant targets that are too weak or otherwise ineffective. 30 Moreover, 
as we argued above, the way in which the penalties would be apportioned 
among tobacco companies (essentially on a market-share basis) would 
undermine each company's incentives to reduce underage smoking.31 
25. See generally Hanson & L ogue, supra note 3, at 1315 (making this point in greater detail). 
26. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 4, at 9-11. 
27. ld. at l 5-17. 
28. Id. at 19-20. 
29. Id. at 24. 
30. For a summary of the look-back provision and critiques of it, see Hanson & L ogue, supra note 3, 
at 1331-36. 
31. See generally Hanson & L ogue, supra note 3, at 1315 (making a fuller version of this point). 
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Finally, the Proposed Resolution is especially remarkable for its 
rejection of ex post incentive-based regulatory approaches. In fact, by 
sharply curtailing products liability law as a means of regulating 
manufacturer behavior, the Proposed Resolution would eliminate the only 
existing incentive-based system with any potential for internalizing the 
external costs of smoking. The Proposed Resolution arguably includes an 
incentive-based component, insofar as the costs imposed on manufacturers 
are required to be passed through to consumers in the form of a price hike. 32 
That mandated price hike would, like an excise tax, force manufacturers to 
bear at least some of the costs of their products. Viewing the Proposed 
Regulation in that light, some scholars have complained that the price hike 
is too small. 33 And some Senators and the Clinton administration have 
recently suggested the possibility of increasing the price hike to some amount 
closer to $ 1 .50 per pack.34 In fact, there appears to be an emerging 
consensus among commentators and policy makers that the regulatory effect 
of the de facto excise tax needs to be enhanced and will have a greater 
regulatory effect than that of other aspects of the Proposed Resolution. But 
again, because of the common-pool problem, even an excise tax of $1 .50 per 
pack would not create incentives for manufacturers to make safer cigarettes. 
Ill. AN INTRODUCTION TO SMOKERS' COMPENSATION 
As we have already mentioned, one type of ex post incentive-based 
regulation of cigarettes is currently in effect-that is, products liability law. 
And compared with the Proposed Resolution, we would prefer the status 
quo, which may be imperfect but at least has the potential for producing the 
sorts of deterrence incentives and pricing effects that we see as important. 
In this Part, however, we explore one alternative to products liability law, 
an administrative system of compensation and cost-internalization that we 
call Smokers ' Compensation. 
The following issues distinguish a Smokers' Compensation regime from 
other conceivable ex post incentive-based approaches, including a products 
32. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 4, at 35. 
33. A ccording to Jeffrey Harris, for instance, the proposed agreement would, if adopted, have the effect 
of a $0.62 per pack excise tax on cigarettes. See Jeffrey E. Harris, Comments on Proposed 
Resolution (last modified June 26, 1997) <http://web. mit. edu/jeffrey/harris/ ACScomments. html>, 
at 1-3 & tbl.2. 
34. See Jeffrey Taylor, More Senators Seem to Back Increasing Cigarette Prices Beyond level in 
Accord, WA LL ST. J. , Sept. 17, 1997, at A4. 
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liability regime: (a) who the decision-maker would be, (b) who the claimant 
would be, (c) what costs would be recoverable by a claimant, (d) what 
evidentiary showing a claimant would have to make to receive compensation, 
and (e) how a claimant's damages would be allocated among cigarette 
-companies. 35 As we describe in greater detail below, one plausible version 
of a Smokers' Compensation regime would (a) be decided by some type of 
administrative tribunal, (b) be open only to smokers themselves or to those 
who bring claims on behalf of smokers (e.g. , the smoker's estate or a 
subrogated insurer), (c) allow recovery only for those costs that tend to be 
covered under standard insurance and existing administrative compensation 
regimes according to pre-determined schedules, (d) require at least 
epidemiological evidence of a causal connection between the claimant's harm 
and her smoking, and (e) allocate damages among cigarette companies, as 
much as is feasible, according to each company's causal contribution to each 
claimant's harms. 
A. · The Tradeoffs Among Accuracy, Complexity, and Political Feasibility 
Perfect cost internalization would be achieved only if all of the external 
costs of smoking were included in the system and only if those costs were 
perfectly allocated among cigarette manufacturers according to the extent to 
which each company's cigarettes contributed to the harm. In such a 
perfectly accurate deterrence regime, each cigarette company would bear 
the full costs of the harms that its cigarettes cause, but only those harms. But 
to achieve such a world would require an incredibly complex cost­
internalization system whose administrative costs would almost certainly 
outweigh its deterrence benefits. Indeed, with any regime that seeks to 
create incentives to optimize deterrence, there is likely to be a tradeoff 
between accuracy and complexity. 36 Because achieving the former would 
3 5. The last two factors could also be understood as part of the same causal analysis. 
36. As Professor Kaplow has observed, increased accuracy in adjudication will not inevitably produce 
deterrence gains. For example, Kaplow notes that, if the parties whose behavior is being regulated 
can only foresee-at the time they decide whether and how to engage in the regulated behavior-the 
average level of hann that their behavior may cause, then it would be a waste of resources to spend· 
money to allocate damages ex post on a more fine-tuned basis. The deterrence benefits of such an 
investment would be nothing. See Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An 
Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGA L STUD. 307, 3 13-14 ( 1994); David Rosenberg, The Causal 
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HAR V. L .  REv. 
849 ( 1 984). Kaplow goes on to argue, however, that a different conclusion may apply if the 
regulated parties have the ability to become informed regarding the actual risks posed by their 
behavior-as opposed to average risk posed by this general type of behavior. Kaplow, supra note 
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often require an increase in. the latter, the goal is to optimize-to pursue 
accuracy until the next dollar in administrative costs incurred to achieve it 
yields only one dollar in welfare gains from improved deterrence. 
Of course, in designing a smokers' compensation system for the real 
world, the goal of efficiency must compete with other goals and interests. 
Our objective in this Article is to propose a system that would be politically 
feasible and would, within the political constraints imposed, optimize the 
complexity and accuracy considerations mentioned above. To make such a· 
proposal, we will assume that within the current political environment the 
following constraints are firmly in place. 37 First, the cigarette industry, 
although potentially on the verge of being subjected to significant 
governmental regulation, 38 has the political muscle39 to avoid a plan that does 
36, at 3 1 6-18. In that case, so long as the more accurate information can be expected to be reflected 
in the ex post damage awards that the regulated parties will have to pay, and so long as the benefits 
of gathering the information (in terms of reduced ex post awards) will exceed the costs of 
information gathering, the regulated parties will have an incentive to acquire the relevant 
information and then to take it into account. Id. at 3 1 7. These conclusions are consistent with the 
reasoning underlying our justification of ex post incentive-based regulation of the cigarette industry. 
Our argument depends on the assumption that the tobacco industry, given the incentive to do so, can 
make ex ante determinations of what their relative share of the smoking-caused harms will be in 
society. 
37. To be clear, it is not our view that many of the political constraints should be constraints. Indeed, 
as a review of our previously published, related work would suggest, we would prefer a world in 
which most of the constraints that we are about to describe did not exist See generally Hanson & 
Logue, supra note 3; Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An 
Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 16 CORNELL L. REv. 1 29 ( 1990); Steven P. Croley 
& Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary easts of Accidents: Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 
108 HAR V. L. REv. 1 787 (1995); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The 
Revived Cas� for Enterprise Liability, 9 1  MICH. L. REv. 683 (1993); Steven P. Croley & Jon D. 
Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for Recent Events in Products Liability, 
8YA LEJ. O NREG. I ( 1991) .  
38.  Cf David E. Rosenbaum, Senators Agree on Forcing Up Cigarette Price, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 
1 998, at A l  ("No other legislation Congress is likely to vote on this year would lead to such 
fundamental changes in the society. President Clinton has called it the most important public health 
measure in years."). 
39. The tobacco industry is, and has long been, a political powerhouse. The industry was described in 
1 979 by Senator Edward M. Kennedy as follows: "[D]ollar for dollar, they're probably the most 
effective lobby on Capitol Hill." Robert Pear, A New leaf; Now, the Archenemies Need Each Other, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1 997, at D I .  Within the last several years, the tobacco industry's lobbying 
efforts have grown particularly intense. In 1997, those efforts included expenditures ofover $30 
million and the employment of such political heavyweights as Howard Baker, George Mitchell, and 
Ann Richards. See Maureen Dowd, Integrity Clearance Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1 997, at A l 3. 
Also in 1 997, Philip Morris was the top soft money contributor in the United States, donating 
$ 1 ,253,253, mostly to the Republican Party. R.J. Reynolds contributed $394,774 in soft money; 
Brown & Williamson $1 70,000; the Tobacco Institute $100,000; and U.S. Tobacco $97 ,650. Center 
for Responsive Politics, 1997 Soft Money Donations (posted Dec. 30, 1 997) 
<http://www.crp.org/pubs/parties/soft97 I .html>; Center for Responsive Politics, Soft Money Special 
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not meet at least some of its interests, particularly its interest in making its 
liability costs more predictable. 40 We also assume that a complete 
prohibition of cigarette sales, at least among adults, is not a viable political 
option. 41 More generally, regulations that would result in the bankruptcy of 
several prominent cigarette manufacturers are unlikely to be adopted. 42 Nor 
are any proposals that would ultimately lead to a substantial black market in 
cigarettes. 43 We assume further that there is a widely held perception among 
Release (posted Feb. 4, 1998) <http://www.crp.org/crpdocs/feb98/softmoneyrelease.html>. In 
addition, those entities' political action committees have made $1 ,024,884 in direct contributions 
to candidates and parties in the 1997-98 campaign cycle. Center for Responsive Politics, CRP 
Special Interest Categories: Tobacco (visited Feb. 1 6, 1998) <http://www.crp.org/cgi­
win/org.exe? A02>. This year, cigarette producers will likely make record contributions, although 
(or perhaps because) their political clout is clearly on the wane. See Jill Abramson, Tobacco 
Industry Steps Up Flow of Campaign Money: Proposed Settlement Leads to Record Giving Even 
as Political Oppposilion Grows, N.Y. TIMES Mar. 8, 1998, at A l .  Though not what it once was, the 
industry's "political influence remains substantial." Rosenbaum, supra note 38, at AIO. 
40. The industry claims that its primary interest is in making its costs predictable. See irifra text 
accompanying notes 1 73-74 (quoting the Proposed Resolution); Rosenbaum, supra note 38, at AIO 
("[Ilhe industry has insisted on protection from lawsuits based on smoking�related illnesses. One 
of the industry's main goals is to have a degree of certainty about how much money it will have to 
pay in legal claims."); Congressional Testimony ofN.G. Brookes, Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer of Brown Williamson Tobacco Corporation, Jan. 29, 1998, 1998 WL 899 1465. ("What· 
does the industry get in return? Our primary benefit is a l imited amount of financial stability from 
the resolution of some product liability claims against-the industry." "[Those civil liability 
l imitations] are valuable to the industry because they provide some stability to our business. We 
defended product liability cases for more than 40 years before entering into the current settlement. 
But we also recognize that the court system can sometimes be unpredictable. The civil liability 
provisions of the Proposed Resolution help us by allowing us to predict our future with some degree 
of certainty."); David E. Rosenbaum, Tobacco Leaders Refuse to Budge on Pact, N.Y.TIMES, Feb. 
28, 1998, at A16  (describing how top tobacco executives testified that "they would never agree to 
modify their advertising and marketing practices unless the lawmakers gave the industry substantial 
protection against lawsuits"); Hatch Says Tobacco Money Will not Be Used for Tax Cuts, 
CONGRESS DAILY, 1998 WL 6604893 (quoting Senator Hatch: "I believe that consensus is 
developing around the idea of including liability provisions in a comprehensive anti-tobacco bill"). 
4 1 .  See, e.g., Congressional Testimony of Attorney General Gale Norton before the, Senate Commerce 
Committee, Feb. 26, 1998, 1998 WL 8992534 ("I think it is naYve to assume that 40-50 mill ion 
current addicted smokers in the United States will simply quit using tobacco products. As the 
country experienced during Prohibition, it is more likely that a ban will result in illegal trafficking 
and smuggling of the product."). 
42. See, e.g., Brookes Testimony, supra note 40; Norton Testimony, supra note 41 (providing a lengthy 
discussion of the problems with bankruptcy). 
43. See, e.g., Rosenbaum, supra note 38, at AIO ("[S]ome [politicians] have cautioned that the price [of 
cigarettes] cannot be pushed so high that an illegal market develops."); David E. Rosenbaum, Fight 
Against Big Tobacco Emboldens Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1998, at Al2 (paraphrasing Newt 
Gingrich as saying that "it was important not to make cigarettes so expensive that a black market 
developed"); Norton Testimony, supra note 4 1  ("Contraband dealers are not going to be subject to 
federal, state or local regulation, will not be concerned with preventing youth state or local 
regulation, will not be concerned with preventing youth from having access to products, and are 
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lawmakers that the tort system (and the jury system) are often random and 
lottery-like and that juries are not capable of accurately deciding cases with 
complex, scientific evidence. Despite distrust of the tort system, we assume 
that any regulation protecting or immunizing the cigarette industry from the 
threat of tort law cannot appear to provide the cigarette industry with 
unprecedented protection. 44 Put differently, cigarette-industry regulations 
similar in kind and scope to those previously applied to other industries are 
likely the path of least political resistance. Additionally, we perceive in the 
tobacco debates a common position that notions of personal responsibility on 
the part of smokers must factor into regulation-that smokers who knew that 
smoking was potentially harmful should not receive a large windfall.45 · 
Finally, a proposal has a greater chance of being enacted; we suspect, if it 
would have the effect of substantially increasing government revenues or 
reducing government expenses. It is within the parameters established by 
those political constraints that we seek to balance deterrence accuracy and 
administrative costs. 46 
A great deal in administrative costs could be saved (and hence 
deterrence could be purchased relatively cheaply) if three things were true. 
First, all smoking-related injuries would be "signature diseases." (They 
would, in other words, be caused exclusively, or nearly so, by smoking.) 
Second, smokers would be steadfastly loyal to their favorite brands of 
cigarettes, sticking to their preferred brand as long as they smoke. And 
third, all smoking-caused damages would be tangible and easily measured. 
In such a cheap-deterrence world, the Smokers' Compensation analysis 
would be greatly simplified. If a claimant had one of the signature diseases, 
the system could easily place liability on the manufacturer that caused the 
harm for an appropriate amount, and the costs of smoking would be 
appropriately internalized. 
The good news is that the ideal world is not as far from the real world 
as most readers might assume. Certain diseases, most notably lung cancer 
and chronic lung disease, are significantly more common among smokers 
certainly not likely to be easily brought into court to compensate those injured. "). 
44. Cf Rosenbaum, supra note 38, at A l  ("The tobacco companies are such pariahs in the public's eye 
that few lawmakers can afford to vote for a bill that the industry endorses. "). 
45. See Hanson & L ogue, supra note 3, at 1350. 
46. I t  is important to note that these political assumptions represent our best estimates of the practical 
constraints facing any tobacco proposal, including our Smokers' Compensation proposal. Differing 
assumptions may change the calculus and suggest different policy choices. A gain, by describing 
these political constraints, we do not mean to endorse them. I ndeed, we find many of them 
lamentable and accept them on pragmatic grounds only because of our impression that they are 
unlikely to change before lawmakers enact some sweeping form of cigarette regulation. 
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than they are among nonsmokers and smoking is very likely to be the central 
cause of those diseases among smokers. 47 We will sometimes refer to these 
as "quasi-signature diseases." There is also evidence that smokers are 
extremely brand loyal. 48 Moreover, a substantial portion of smoking costs 
is economic and may be easily and accurately measured. 49 Thus: except for 
the sheer volume of claims that would be brought, we are hard pressed to 
imagine a commonly used consumer product for which a deterrence-oriented 
ex post compensation system could be more easily and effectively adopted. 
47. For example, 87% of all cases of lung cancer, a disease that kills 123,000 Americans annually, are 
attributable to smoking, though only 30% of the population smokes. To put the point differently; 
a smoker is 22.4 times more likely to die of lung cancer than is a nonsmoker. For chronic lung 
diseases, such as emphysema, the numbers are 72% and 9. 6 times. Other diseases exhibit similar 
incidence levels in smokers: for example, mouth cancer (89% and 27.5 times), laryngeal cancer 
(74% and 10. 5 times), and esophageal cancer (66% and 7. 6 times). See Patrick Remington, 
Assessing the Health Effects of the Proposed Tobacco Settlement (Working Paper: Proceedings of 
the Conference on the So-Called Global Tobacco Settlement: Its Implications for Public Health and 
Public Policy) at 8, tbl. I. 
48. Professor Pollay and his co-authors recently summarized the evidence on brand loyalty as follows: 
The cigarette industry is . . .  well known for its phenomenally high brand loyalty, 
the highest of all consumer product categories . . . .  A relatively low rate of brand 
switching is evident, typically 10% or less . . . .  There is nominal switching within 
brand families (e.g., from Brand X milds to Bran.d X lights), which is of little 
consequence to a firm's net profit. High brand loyalty resulting from nicotine 
"satisfaction" of those addicted makes it difficult and expensive to convert 
competitors' customers. Most of the brand switching that does occur is by older, 
health-concerned, or symptomatic smokers trading down, typically within a brand 
family, to products with lower tar and nicotine labeling, in the misguided belief that 
those products are safer. As a result, the net present value of gaining the trade of 
these older customers is low compared with the value inherent in attracting young 
starters, the vast bulk of whom will be highly brand loyal for many years . . . .  
Richard W. Pollay, et al., The Last Straw? Cigarette Advertising and Realized Market Shares 
Among Youths and Adults, 1979-93, 60 J. OF M KT' G I (1996) (citations omitted); See also Joe B. 
Tye, et al., Tobacco Advertising and Consumption: Evidence of a Causal Relationship, 8 J. Pue. 
HEA L TH PoL'Y 492, 493 ( 1987) ("Cigarettes enjoy one of the most tenacious brand loyalties of any 
consumer product."); Philip H. Dougherty, A.MA. s Assault on Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1985, 
at 029 ("Unlike most products you could name, cigarettes engender considerable brand loyalty."); 
OFFICE O N  SMO KING & HEA LTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEA LTH & HUMA N  SER VS. , REDUCING THE HEA L TH 
CONSEQUENCES OF SMO KING: 25 YEARS OF PRO GRESS 507 ( 1989) [hereinafter SUR GEON GENERA L'S 
PROGRESS REPORT] (reviewing studies that indicate that fewer than I 0% f smokers change brands 
in any given year and that "[m]uch of the limited brand switching that occurs is necessarily between 
brands of the same company"). 
49. One study estimated that the economic costs of smoking in direct health care costs and lost 
productivity were $100 billion in 1993. AMER ICA N CA NCER SOCIETY, CA NCER FA CTS & 
FIGURES-1997 23 (1997). We will describe losses as "economic" or "pecuniary" if they are 
conventionally characterized that way. Our view, however, is that many so-called "economic" 
losses are actually nonpecuniary losses that can be readily measured. See Croley & Hanson, The 
Nonpecuniary Cost 'of Accidents, supra note 37, at 1857-61. 
. 
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Nevertheless, the cheap-deterrence conditions are not always met, at 
least not entirely. For instance, although smoking is known to increase the 
risk of heart disease, there are a number of other potential causes of heart 
disease as well. Similarly, some smokers do occasionally switch brands. 
Insofar as the real world diverges from the cheap-deterrence world, it 
becomes necessary to weigh the value of increased accuracy in attaching 
injury costs to manufacturers against the administrative costs of achieving 
that accuracy. A similar tradeoff between accuracy and administrability 
exists with respect to calculating real-world damages.so 
In the following section, we explore how the balance between accuracy 
and complexity in adjudication has been struck in a number of real-world 
regulatory contexts that are similar (and dissimilar) in important ways to the 
cigarette context and in which political constraints similar to those we 
highlighted above played a role. Then in Part IV, we describe a range of 
options for how the tradeoff between accuracy and complexity might 
plausibly be made in connection with a Smokers' Compensation regime. 
B. Rea� World Models for Smokers' Compensation 
Causation-based administrative alternatives to tort law are by no means 
strangers to the legal landscape.s1 Workers' compensation systems usually 
provide the exclusive remedy for employees injured on the job in every 
50. One implication of this analysis of the tradeoffbetween accuracy and complexity is that, before any 
new regulatory regime is adopted, policymakers should dedicate some resources (time, effort, 
perhaps money on research) to examining further the extent to which there are signature smoking 
diseases and the extent to which smokers are brand loyal. 
51. Professors Abraham and Liebman have drawn a distinction between three types of compensation 
systems: loss based, causation based, and fault based. Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, 
Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for 
ll/ness and Injury, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 75, 86 (1993). Under a loss-based system, a claimant must 
show that she has suffered a loss. The source of the loss and the circumstances in which the loss 
occurred are largely irrelevant. Examples of a loss-based system include any private or public first­
party health, life, or disability insurance. Under a causation-based approach, by contrast, the 
claimant must show not only that she suffered a loss but also that it was the result of a particular 
type of cause. For example, under worker.i' compensation, the claimant must show not only her loss 
but also that it was work related. Finally, under the fault-based approach, the claimant must show 
a) that she suffered a loss, b) caused by a particular party, c) who was negligent or otherwise at fault. 
The tort system is the obvious example. Smokers' Compensation is, as we have said, a causation­
based approach. Abraham and Liebman do not attribute any special deterrence advantage to 
causation-based compensation systems, but rather focus on fault-based approaches as a potential 
source of deterrence. Id. at 87-88. Even with respect to fault-based regimes, however, Abraham 
and Liebman are skeptical that the deterrence benefits are as great as is claimed, especially in cases 
involving long-latency periods. Id. 
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state. 52 Federal causation-based compensation systems include the Black 
Lung Benefit Program for miners suffering from lung disease and the 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program for victims of illnesses 
contracted from immunizations. 53 The Dalkon S hield Claimants Trust, 
established through settlement of a class-action lawsuit, provides an example 
of a privately-developed alternative to tort law. Those examples il lustrate 
how other compensation systems have dealt with the five factors-who 
decides, who brings claims, which costs are covered, what evidentiary 
showing is required, and how to allocate damages-when juggling accuracy, 
administrability, and political constraints. Perhaps more important, those 
examples, taken together, deliver a fairly clear message that although state 
and federal legislatures have occasionally been willi ng to create some tort­
law immunity for some industries, they have rarely done so without 
simultaneously substituting some form of ex post compensation system in its 
place. Thus, the tobacco industry, in lobbying for the Proposed Resolution, 
appears to be seeking special treatment not just among most product 
manufacturers, who have long been and would remain subject to tort 
penalties, but also among that tiny minority of industry groups that have been 
granted substantial tort law protection. 
1 .  Workers ' Compensation 
Workers' compensation is a causation-based compensation system that 
functions largely outside of the courts and provides the exclusive remedy in 
most worker injury cases. 54 The details vary from state to state, but the basic 
form is usually similar. 55 A workers' compensation claim is initiated by the 
injured employee, who notifies his employer and then seeks medical care. 
C laimants are required to bring forth (1) evidence substantiating proof of 
52. U.S. C HA MBER OF CO MMERC E, 1994 A NALYSI S  OF w ORKERS, COMP ENSA TIO N LAW S at vii ( 1994 ).  
53.  For a brief description of the Childhood Vaccination Compensation Program, see Robert L. Rabin, 
Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 Mo. L. 
REV. 95 1 ,  955- 60 (1993). The Black Lung program is discussed in PETER S. BARTH, THE TRAG EDY 
OF BLACK LU NG: FEDERAL CO MPENSA TIO N FOR OCCUPA TIO NAL DISEA SE (1987). 
54. See Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers ' Compensation Statutes, 
96 HARV. L. REv. 1 641  ( 1 993). Due to administrative delays, inadequate benefits, and frequent 
contests about compensation or degree of impairment, there have been doctrinal exceptions carved 
out of the general "exclusive remedy" doctririe. These include the "dual capacity" exception 
(allowing employees to sue employers for torts based on independent duties generated by 
nonemployer-employee relationships), and the exceptions for suits against parent/sibling 
corporations, for intentionally inflicted torts, and for contribution and indemnity from third-parties. 
55. The procedures and structure described here are drawn primarily from New York. 
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employment, 56 (2) factual information regarding the workplace; and (3) 
medical records detailing the injury.58 The employer or the employer's 
insurer, not the employee, pays for necessary medical care.59 An injured 
worker may collect actual medical expenses and lost earnings. 60 The lost 
earnings are awarded after only a short wait, and amount to a fraction, 
usually two-thirds, of earnings up to a statewide maximum.61 Most workers' 
compensation systems also award scheduled awards for partial permanent 
disability, such as loss of a limb, but do not explicitly compensate intangible 
losses, such as pain and suffering. 62 In nearly all jurisdictions, workers' 
co mpensation decisions are made by an administrative law judge or panel, 
and usually may be appealed to the workers' compensation board. 
Most states require employers to carry workers' compensatio n · 
insurance, which covers workers' compensation awards. When the 
employer does not comply with the insurance requirer:.nent, many states 
follo w  New York in establishing some type of an Uninsured Employees 
Fund which immediately compensates the employee and retains the right to 
later sue the uninsured employer for indemnification. 63 
56. See THOMAS F. MANCUSO, HELP FOR THE WORKING WOUNDED 203 ( 1976). 
51. Id (noting "the e of work done and the work exposures to specific dusts, fumes, mists, gases, noise, 
etc; the presence or absence of ventilation control measures; the presence or absence of protective · 
clothing, including respirators that may be required; information as to whether air-sampling and 
measurements of toxic substances were done, where, when, and how often"). 
58. Id. ("These would include the medical examinations and tests, like chest x-ray, blood and urine 
59. 
analyses, done at the time of hiring and subsequent tests at the plant during the course of 
employment."). 
Subrogation is an issue only where a third party is either partially or fully responsible for the 
employee's injuries. The employee may bring a suit against the third party for full damages 
regardless of the outside party's level of culpability. The third party, in return, can sue the employer 
for contribution, and the employer is then said to have a "lien" on the employee's winnings for any 
WC benefits previously paid. See William Bassin, An Analysis of Employer Contribution to Third 
Parties Under Workers ' Compensation Statutes, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 844 ( 1995). 
60. See Martin Minkowitz, Introduction to Workers ' Compensation Law, 460 PLI/Lit 1 1  ( 1 993). 
6 I. Id. 
62. Most states do, however, provide for cases of mental distress-especially mental injuries resulting 
from "sudden" work-related instances-cumulative trauma, and rehabilitation expenses. See Gary 
T. Schwartz, Waste, Fraud and Abuse in Workers ' Compensation: The Recent California 
Experience, 52 Mo. L. REv. 983 (1993); see also Donald T. DeCarlo & Martin Minkowitz, Workers ' 
Compensation and Employers ' Liability Law: Recent Developments, 26 TORT & INS. L. J. 444 
( 199 1 ). 
63. See MINKOWITZ, supra note 60, at 1 0. 
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The historical forces behind the state-by-state adoption of workers' 
compensation laws were strikingly parallel to the forces behind the current -
efforts to adopt new forms of cigarette-industry regulation. Prior to 
enactment of workers' compensation laws, employers had long enjoyed 
virtually complete tort law immunity because of the assumption of risk 
defense and similar defenses available to manufacturers. For numerous 
reasons,64 that state of affairs began to change in the early twentieth 
century. 65 For example, according to one study, the known injury values 
for 55 of the work-injury cases filed against the U. S. Steel company in Ohio 
between 1 898 and 1915 indicate that the " market value" of workers' injuries 
increased sevenfold (see Figure 1) .66 "What these figures roughly 
demonstrate is that . . . both juries and judges were more and more inclined 
to shift that social cost of work-sustained injury over to the corporate balance 
sheet. This spiraling injury value phenomenon was well known to employers 
generally. "67 
64_ Several states passed statutes severely limiting the traditional employers' defenses to liability. For 
example, Ohio passed the Norris Act in 19 10  which gutted the "fellow servant" rule by expanding 
the definition of superior servants. See PAUL B. BELLAMY, A HISTORY OF WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION 1898-191 s: FROM COURTROOM TO BOARDROOM 38 ( 1 997). And California passed 
a similar act, the Roseberry Act, in 191 1 which abolished the common law defenses and imposed 
liability without regard to negligence for injuries sustained by the employee in the course of his 
employment. See Rita Maroney McPeake, Managing the Private Law Library 1992: Trends, Ideas 
and Solutions: Workers ' Compensation Law, 335 PU/Pat 408 ( 1 992). 
65. DON DEWEES, DAVID DUFF & MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: 
TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSL y 349 ( 1996) (hereinafter DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK l ("When 
workers' compensation insurance was first introduced, the tort law applicable to workplace 
accidents was in a process of rapid evolution. The nineteenth century doctrines of voluntary 
assumption of risk, the fellow-servant rule, and contributory negligence-all of which had acted as 
bars to tort recovery by injured workers-were being transformed or discarded, and workers were 
succeeding in an increased number of cases." (footnotes omitted)). 
66. See Bellamy, supra note 64, at 169. 
67. Id. at 1 70-7 1 .  
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At the same time, lawmakers became serious about adopting greater worker 
protections outside of tort law. 68 Underlying both types of changes were 
numerous social , political, and economic shifts that combined to make 
judges, juries, and legislatures more sensitive to the plight of injured 
workers . 69 Broadly speaking, as Progressive notions of national 
68. See GRATTET T. RYKEN, AT PLA y IN THE FIELD OF THE LAW: PROGRESSIVE REFORMERS AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT LAW 56 ( 1994). Ryken claims that legislators, seeing 
the problem of industrial accidents as a public health concern amidst a messy legal doctrine of 
private contract. "created a space for the state, as representative of the public. to become a kind of 
third party to the employment contract. The state's job would be to ensure that the contract did not 
produce any harms to the public health and welfare." See also Paul Raymond Gurtler, The Workers · 
Compensation Principle: A Historical Abstract of the Nature of Workers · Compensation, 9 
HAM LINE J. Pue. L. & PoL'Y 285, 292 ( 1988) ("[H]eavy reliance on tort theory actual ly led to the 
eventual enactments of Employers' Liability Statutes across the country. However, tort theory, at 
best, only played the limited role of restoring 'the [injured] employee to a position no worse than 
that of a stranger injured by the negligence of the employer . . . .  ' Quite obviously, a new legal 
principle was needed."). 
69. For a description of some of the historical factors surrounding the rise ofworkmens' compensation. 
see Bellamy, supra note 64, at 24, 109, 120 & 205. 
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responsibility took root, the discourse regarding industrial accidents was 
transformed from purely a matter of private contract between master and 
servant into a major public health concern. 70 
In light of those historical forces, workers ' compensation laws have 
often been described as a compromise solution among the various interests 
at stake .71 Employers escaped the growing threat of tort damages but, in 
exchange, had to accept partial responsibility for all work-related injuries 
and deaths. Particularly because of its institutional advantages in 
aggregating, managing and accumulating injury statistics, corporate America 
is said to have had a strong economic motive to trade rising compensation 
awards and uncertain liability for predictably capped damage amounts .72 
Arguably, some injured workers, who otherwise may have faced the obstacle 
of overcoming one or more employer tort-law defenses, also benefited from 
the more certain and more immediate, albeit less generous, awards of 
workers' compensation laws.73 In short, the reduced administrative cost and 
the greater certainty regarding the outcome of each individual case 
represented a savings to both sides . 
The experience of workers' compensation systems indicates that the 
primary goals motivating them have been reasonably well served. 
Administrative costs constitute 153-203 of total costs of claims in U . S .  
workers ' compensation systems (and only around 103 o f  the workers' 
compensation system in Ontario) . 74 In contrast, the administrative costs of 
70. See Ryken, supra note 68, at 19. 
7 1 .  Compare BELLAMY, supra note 64, at 184 (noting that "the refonn received the unflinching support 
of the state's large manufacturing employers . . . .  At least part of the impetus for pushing for the 
refonn lay in the recent passage of the Norris Act, which severely delimited the employer defenses 
of contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule . . .  ) with U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
SUMMARY OF STATE WORKMENS' COMPENSATION LAW, LABOR LAW SERIES No. 10 ( 1997) 
("Workmens' compensation laws are intended to assure prompt payment of benefits to employees 
injured in the course of their employment or to the dependents of those killed, regardless of fault, 
and with a minimum of legal fonnality."). 
72. See, e.g., BELLAMY, supra note 64, at 206 ("The large industrial, transportation and insurance 
corporations conducted operations large enough to amass the actuarial data required to come to an 
understanding of the predictable course of employee injuries, examined over time."). Note that 
workers' compensation costs did not reflect a pure cost increase to employers who were then able 
to lower wages because of the credible promise of ex post compensation that they provided. 
DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 65, at 347-48, 396. 
73. BELLAMY, supra note 64, at 37-40. The traditional defenses were: assumption of risk, contributory 
negl igence, and the fellow-servant rule. Note, however, that, by the early 20th century, those 
defenses had been largely undennined by state statutes outlawing traditional defenses, see supra 
note 65--{)6 and accompanying text, and the applicable negligence standard may have expanded into 
a de facto strict liability rule, see BELLAMY, supra note 64, at 202. Thus, workmens' compensation 
may have merely "refonned the system by freezing it in stasis." Id. 
74. See DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 65, at 393-94. 
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the tort system eat up closer to 50 % of the total costs of claims. 75 Workers' 
compensation benefits in this country typicall y are paid within three weeks 
to four months of when a claim is initiated, whereas the delay in most tort 
claims (at least those made in federal courts) is between fifteen to twenty 
months.76  
Although workplace-accident deterrence· is not the primary goal of 
workers' compensation systems, it bears noting that those systems have had 
significant deterrence benefits.77 Professors Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock 
have summarized most of the empirical evidence comparing the efficacy of 
workers' compensation programs to alternative or supplementary regulatory 
options, incl uding tort l aw, command-and-control style administrative 
regulation,78 criminal sanctions, informational policies, and tax and insurance 
instruments. In their opinion, the evidence reflects well on workers' 
compensation programs. 
As they conclude, the 
operation of the workers' compensation system does reduce worker injury 
rates and that for high-risk industries and risk-rated firms this reduction is 
substantial , although the absolute magnitude of the effect is subject to 
enormous uncertainty. We accept the evidence that this effect is greater 
than that created by the tort system or that created by U.S. federal 
occupational safety and health regulation. 79 
75. Id. at 394. 
76. Id. These statistics must be viewed with caution, however. The costs of administering occupational 
disease claims and the time necessary for administering such claims are significantly higher than 
that of average workers compensation claims (though still significantly lower than that of the 
average tort claim). Id. It seems likely that at least some of the special costs and delays created by 
disease claims under workers' compensation systems would be present in many of the claims 
brought under a Smokers' Compensation system. 
77. See id. at 386 ("Workers' compensation is designed primarily to compensate workers, with 
deterrence of harmful behavior as a secondary goal ."). 
78. Id. at 365 (explaining, as we would predict, that "[m]ost of the economics literature argues that 
OSHA has set inappropriate standards, and even those who tend to support a significant regulatory 
role for OSHA have difficulty with the existing type of standards"). 
79. Id. at 382; see id. at 378-82 (summarizing various studies); see also id. at 386 ("The most dramatic 
findings is that of Moore and Viscusi, who conclude that the occupational fatal ity rate in the United 
States would have been 40% higher were it not for the deterrent effect of workers' compensation, 
implying that workers' compensation has been far more effective in saving workers' l ives than 
OSHA, for which the reduction in risk levels has been estimated to be as low as 2o/o-4%." (citation 
omitted)); id. at 389 (explaining how workers' compensation system has such useful deterrence 
effects). 
· 
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Indeed, in their view, the "relatively impressive perfonnance of the workers' 
compensation system, and its considerable advantages and modest 
disadvantages relative to tort, may explain why criticism of workers' 
compensation over many decades has consistently led to recommendations 
for refonn and adjustment rather than for abolition. "80 
2. Childhood Vaccination Compensation Program (CVCP) 
The CVCP creates something of a hybrid system between a fault-based 
system and a causation-based compensation system. A party injured by one 
of the covered childhood vaccines files a petition with the U.S.  Claims Court 
along with certain infonnation necessary for a finding that compensation is 
due. The Court then appoints a special master to conduct hearings and make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The master is empowered to require 
evidence, including testimony, production of documents, and hearings. 
There is no discovery, cross-examination, pleadings, or trial . If neither 
party contests the master's  findings, the court must accept them. Otherwise, 
the court will review the evidence and make a detennination and award 
damages . Claimants are not responsible for establishing causation by a 
standard of "scientific certainty. "  Rather, the injured party is responsible for 
producing documents, reports, and any infonnation regarding the nature, 
causation, or aggravation of a specific illness, which the special master will 
weigh according to a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. 
Compensation is contingent upon the injured party's showing either that ( 1 )  
she has experienced one of the four injuries or conditions listed on the 
vaccine injury table, or (2) in cases involving injuries not listed on the table 
or outside the stringent time frame, that her injury is more likely than not 
linked to the vaccine. 81 
The program compensates for economic losses of unreimbursed medical 
costs , lost wages, and reasonable attorney's  fees. It also allows up to 
$250,000 in pain and suffering damages at the discretion of the judge, and 
a flat $250,000 death benefit. Damage awards are paid by a fund 
administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services and financed 
80. Id. at 396; see also id. at 361 ("There has been no suggestion that workers' compensation should 
be abandoned and replaced by a pure tort system; indeed, this would be counter to trends in other 
fields where negligence-based tort recoveries are being replaced, at least in part, by no-fault or 
general accident insurance schemes. Nothing in our empirical review would lead us to propose such 
a change."). . 
8 1 .  See Susan G .  Clark, Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act: The National Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program, 94 Eo. LAW REP. 67 1 ,  676-77 ( 1994). 
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by an excise tax on the sale of the covered vaccines . Manufacturers are 
therefore either not liable for damages awarded by the CVCP or, to the . 
extent they are, their liability is allocated by market share. 82 The CVCP is 
meant to be expeditious (proceedings should not exceed one year), 
accessible, and informal . 83 The act imposed on lawyers an "ethical 
obligation" to inform their clients about the process and instructs the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to publicize the system. 
After the Claims Court rules on a claimant's case, the claimant has a 
choice either to accept that award or, within 90 days, to file a tort action. 
To discourage tort claims, however, the vaccine statute limits manufacturers' 
liability somewhat. First, manufacturers are immunized from liability in tort 
for the unavoidable side effects of the vaccine, if the product was properly 
prepared and accompanied by warnings, which are presumed to be adequate. 
Relatedly, the statute specifically provides that warnings can be made to 
physicians, and they need not necessarily be provided to end users-a result 
that effectively preempts some state rulings on this question. Finally, 
punitive damages are sharply restricted. 84 
The reasons for providing special tort protections to manufacturers of 
childhood vaccines were, at least abstractly, similar to the reasons now 
offered for providing cigarette manufacturers some tort law protections. 
That is, putatively unpredictable, expanding, and administratively costly tort 
liability did not provide injured consumers reliable compensation and 
threatened the very survival of an industry (or at least certain members of an 
industry) that policy makers believed should be protected. 85 Insofar as the 
82. Eliminating inanufacturer liability in fact motivated creation of the CVCP. The program was 
enacted in response to a perceived vaccination crisis, in which manufacturers of beneficial products 
were pulling their products from U.S. markets to avoid crippling lawsuits. Given vaccines' positive 
externalities to the community and the requirement in all states and the District of Columbia that 
children be vaccinated, Congress considered it appropriate that the public at large bear the costs. 
See Mary Beth Neraas, Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solution 
to the Vaccine Liability Crisis? 63 WASH. L. REv. 149, I SO-S I ( 1988). 
83. But see Lisa J. Steel, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Is This the Best 
We Can Do for Our Children?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 144, 146 (arguing that the "strict adherence 
by the Special Masters and the Department of Health and Human Services to the Vaccine Injury 
Table . . .  makes it nearly impossible to establish an injury outside that Table. The Compensation 
Program under the Act is adversarial and the issues are technical . . .  "). 
84. See Randall B .  Keiser, Deja Vu All Over Again? The National Childhood Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Act of 1986, 41 Fooo & DRUG L.J. 1 5  ( 1992). 
SS. See DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 6S, at 240-4S; Clark, supra note 8 1 ,  at 674 
(describing the dual concerns of inadequate, time-consuming litigation on the part of the plaintiffs, 
and possible market elimination of vaccine manufacturers in a world of increasing liability for 
unavoidable injuries); see also Neraas, supra note 82, at I S9 (arguing that inconsistent court 
decisions regarding manufacturers' duties to warn have created a disincentive for pharmaceuticals 
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CVCP protects the industry from tort liability, however, the goal of the 
system appears to be purely a compensation goal , not a deterrence goal. 
That goal is, we think, understandable in part because some of the basic 
deterrence arguments in favor of liability do not clearly apply in the vaccine 
context86 and in part because there remains under the CVCP a residual role 
for tort law to protect against the manufacture of unsafe vaccines . 87 Very 
recent developments suggest that the goal of keeping the vaccine industry 
afloat by reducing the threat of tort liability has been met. 88 
3. Black Lung Program 
Congress established the Black Lung Program in 1969 to provide 
benefits to coal miners, and their surviving dependents , who are totally 
disabled by or who die from pneumoconiosis (black lung disease) arising 
from their employment in or around the nation's coal mines. 89 Initially the 
Social Security Administration administered the Black Lung Program, but 
since 1978 the Department of Labor has administered virtually all claims.90 
The Deputy Commissioner of the Workers ' Compensation Program reviews 
the claims.91 There are three requirements to receive benefits which the 
claimant can establish by advancing rebuttable presumptions :92 (1)  the miner 
to continue manufacturing vaccines). 
86. See DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 65, at 240-42; Croley & Hanson, supra note 37, at 
87- 88; see also Neraas, supra note 82, at 163 (stating that the tort system is not appropriate where 
society has enacted a compulsory public health measure "knowingly undertaking the risk that a 
small number of children will inevitably suffer severe reactions from the vaccination"); Steel, supra 
note 83, at I 52 ("Vaccines cannot be made free from risk of injury but they are necessary for society 
to defeat disease."). 
87. See DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 65, at 243 (describing the residual role of tort law in 
this context); Keiser, supra note 84, at 68 (explaining that only failure to warn of unavoidable 
adverse side effects and failure to provide direct warnings to the ultimate recipient of the vaccine 
are preempted by the CVCP, but that all other theories of potential liability remain available to 
plaintiffs, including those for defectively designed vaccine products and manufacturing defects). 
88. See Elyse Tanouye, The Vaccine Business Gets a Shot in the Arm, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1998, at 
B I  (describing why "the vaccine business is heating up, with potentially huge implications for drug­
industry profits and public health," including the "changes in product-liability laws"). 
89. Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 91-1 73, 83 Stat. 792 ( 1 969) 
(codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (1994)). See generally DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, 
supra note 65, at 394-95 (describing the Black Lung program as a type of workers' compensation 
program). 
90. See FRANK. S. BLOCH, FEDERAL DISABILITY LAW AND PRACTICE 548 ( 1989). 
9 1 .  See 20 C.F.R. § 725.351 ( 1997). 
92. See Barth, supra note 53, at 1 1 5. A miner with pneumoconiosis who is able to establish 
employment of I 5 years or more in an underground coal mine and where evidence indicates total ly 
disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the 
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must have a total disability arising out of coal mine employment, (2) the total 
disability must be due to pneumoconiosis, and (3) the pneumoconiosis must 
be the result of coal mine employment. 93 Total disability is defined as the 
inability to engage in gainful employment requiring the skills and abilities 
comparable to those that a miner uses in coal mine employment. 94 Once the 
claimant meets the burden of establishing a presumption, the burden shifts 
to the coal mine operator or the Department to rebut the claim.95 This can 
be a difficult burden to meet, however, given the specific lines of argument 
that the Labor Department has identified as not being sufficient to defeat the 
presumption. For example, the presumption does not shift after a showing 
by the defendant that the claimant had other lung conditions, that the 
claimant had other respiratory problems before coming to work at the mines, 
or that the claimant was exposed to additional dust in another employment 
setting .96 
If the burden is not met by the employer, the claimant may receive 
income benefits (37 .5 % of the federal Grade GS-2 salary level) , 97 medical 
benefits, 98 and reasonable attorney fee'S'. Surviving spouses, divorced 
spouses, children, siblings, parents , and other dependents of the deceased 
miner may claim benefits after the miner 's  death. 100 The benefits 
administered by the Department of Labor are paid by the responsible coal 
mine operator; 101 if there is not a responsible coal mine operator, the federal 
Black Lung Disability Trust Fund pays the beneficiary. 102 The Fund is 
supported by an excise tax on producers of coal for each ton of coal sold. 103 
The benefits administered by the Social Security Administration are paid out 
of the federal government's  general revenues.  
If either the claimant or the operator is dissatisfied with the Department' s  
decision, an objection must be filed within 30  days. 104 After another 
miner is totally disabled by pneumoconiosis. 
93. See Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWOP, U.S. Dept. of Labor, 484 U.S. 1 35, 14 1  ( 1 987); see also 
30 U.S.C. § 901 (a) ( 1994). 
94. See 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(l)(A) (1994); 20 C.F.R. § 7 1 8.204(b) (1997); see generally 20 C.F.R. § 7 1 8  
( 1997). 
95. See 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b) ( 1997). 
96. See Barth, supra note 53, at 1 1 2. 
97. See 30 U.S.C. § 922 ( 1 994); 20 C.F.R. § 725.520 (1 997). 
98. See 30 U.S.C. § 924(a) ( 1994). 
99. See 26 U.S.C. § 9501 (d) ( 1994); 20 C.F.R. § 725.530 (1997). 
1 00. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.201 ( 1997). 
I O I .  See 30 U.S.C. § 932(b) ( 1 994). 
102.  See 26 U.S.C. § 950 1(d) ( 1 994); 30 U.S.C. § 934 (1 994). 
103. See 26 U.S.C. § 4 1 2 1  ( 1 994). 
1 04. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.4 19 (1997). 
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Department review, a party can appeal to an administrative law judge to 
review findings of fact and law. 105 Further appeals are taken to the Benefits . 
Review Board, which was established by the Longshoremen's  and Harbor 
Workers ' Compensation Act, 106 and then to the Court of Appeals for the 
circuit where they most recently worked and most likely acquired 
pneumoconiosis. 107 
The history of the Black Lung movement differs somewhat from the 
other causation-based compensation programs in that it arose out of a 
growing public awareness of (1) the specific dangers surrounding the mining 
industry and its workers, 108 (2) the insufficiency of state workers' 
compensation programs with respect to injured miners, 109 and (3) gradual 
medical acceptance of the existence of such "dust diseases. " 1 10 In addition, 
the political leverage gained through a series of "wildcat strikes" in 1969, 1 1 1  
as well as the failure of the mine operators to present a unified opposition, 1 1 2  
allowed the miners and their advocates to aggressively lobby for stringent 
safety standards and adequate compensation programs. Despite the initial 
legislative focus on safety, most of the battle lines between the operators and 
the miners were drawn with regard to the issue of "compensation, " and 
subsequently, to the problematic issue of the funding source behind any such 
compensatory program. As Senator Byrd's testimony indicates, the primary 
concern in drafting was not in deterring operators or allocating responsibility 
especially at a time when "overhead costs [were] already very high and at a 
time when it [was] difficult for the product [coal] to remain competitive in 
105. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.421 ( 1997). 
106. See 33 U.S.C. § 92 1(b) ( 1994); 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.48 1 ;  801-802.44 ( 1 997). 
107. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.482; 802.4 10; 802.4 1 1  ( 1997). 
I 08. The Farmington disaster, resulting in the death of 1 1 9 miners in West Frankfort, Illinois, exposed 
the dangerous, highly risky nature of the coal mining industry and created a charged political 
environment ripe for reform. See BARBARA ELLEN SMITH, DIGGING OUR OWN GRAVES: COAL 
MINERS AND THE STRUGGLE OVER BLACK LUNG DISEASE 101--02 (1 987). 
I 09. Barth, supra note' 53, at 9. 
1 10. Smith, supra note I 08, at I 07 ("ff]he research of a few dissenting physicians began to confirm the 
longstanding experiential knowledge of those who had lived with and died from black lung 
disease."). 
1 1 1 .  Barth, supra note 53, at 1 1 .  
1 12. Smith, supra note I 08, at 130. There was a split between the older mine operators who feared any 
attempts at reform, and the newer, corporately owned operators who acknowledged the reality of 
attracting "new miners in a period of economic expansion and tight labor markets." Id. These 
operators were more open to reform but "resolved to shape any legislation to their own advantage." 
Id. at 1 3 1 .  
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the marketplace. " 1 13 Rather, the key concern was " to w ork out some 
program whereby these old and disabled miners . . . who have not qualified 
under State [workers' compensation] statutes for disability payments, can be 
given assistance through some Federal-State program. " 1 14 Consequently, the 
designers of the Black Lung program did not tie funding of the program to 
the safety conditions or records of individual employers, and the program 
has had virtually no beneficial deterrence effect. 1 1 5  
4. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (DSCT) 
A fourth example of a no-fault, causation-based regime is the result, not 
o f  legislation, but of priv ate ordering through judicial supervision. The 
Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust was created by settlement of tort claims 
against the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device. 1 1 6 The 
settlement created a " global peace, " permanently enjoining suits against the 
manufacturer (in bankruptcy at the time), its owners and company officials, 
its insurer, and do ctors or health care providers who might otherwise have 
faced malpractice claims. 1 1 7  A $2.3 billion trust was created and 
administered by five independent trustees appointed by the court. 1 1 8 The 
trustees developed a plan whereby potential claimants were offered one of 
three settlement options. 1 1 9  
1 13 .  See Legislative History of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1 969, Pub. L .  No. 
91-173, at 399; see also Smith, supra note 1 08, at 1 4 1  (explaining that the result of such 
compensation legislation was to take "the heat off the industry and put it on agencies and 
administrators in Washington D.C."). 
1 14. Legislative History of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 9 1-1 73, 
at 349; see also DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 65, at 394 (''The black lung program was 
introduced . . . in response to the lack of state compensation for coal miners disabled by 
pneumoconiosis (lung disease arising from dust inhalation)."). Specifically, Senator Byrd strongly 
believed that such responsibility was the duty of Congress: "I have felt that if the Federal 
Government could provide assistance along this line, without additional cost to the industry, we 
would not incur the opposition of the industry . . .  the Federal Government would be assuming some 
responsibility in this area, and I think it should assume such responsibility." Legislative History of 
the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 9 1 - 1 73, at 349. 
1 1 5 .  See W. Kip Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim Compensation 
and Risk Regulation, 2 YALE J. ON R.Eo. 53, 65 ( 1984). 
1 16. See Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or Found)? 61  
FORDHAM L .  RE V. 617, 629 ( 1992). 
1 1 7. Id. 
1 1 8. Id. at 630. 
1 1 9. A court order established a bar date, which established a deadline by which the claimants had to file 
their claim for compensation (later permitting disallowed claimants the opportunity to seek 
reinstatement). Id. at 627-28. 
548 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 22 
Under Option 1 ,  designed to eliminate as many frivolous and low-value 
claims as possible, 120 any claimant who filed an affidavit stating that she had 
used and had been injured by (or may have been injured by) the Dalkon 
Shield received a payment of $725 . 121 Even those claimants whose 
documentation showed a conflict were paid that amount, since the Trust 
reasoned it was less expensive to pay this sum than to expend greater costs 
to investigate the claim. 122 Option 2 was intended to resolve the majority of 
claims and was designed to "provide moderate, standardized payments to 
individuals with relatively mild injuries. " 123 Under this option, the claimant 
was required to allege one or more specific, scheduled injuries (such as 
pelvic inflammatory disease) and to answer questions under oath regarding 
use of the device. 124 In addition, the claimant was required to offer medical 
records (or an affidavit from a health care provider) documenting her use of 
the device and her injury. 125 "Payments available under Option 2 range from 
$400 for a loss of consortium claim by the spouse of a Dalkon Shield user 
to $5,500 for a user who had certain conditions . . . that resulted in 
nonvoluntary sterilizing surgery. " 126 
Finally, claimants who did not resolve their claims under Options 1 or 
2 could proceed under Option 3, under which specially trained employees 
of the trust would review the medical evidence according to a "highly 
structured, rules-based process. " 127 Claimants would then be offered the 
trust's "best and final offer" based on projected settlement value, a valuation 
that is supposed to ignore whether the claimant was represented or had filed 
a lawsuit prior to the settlement. 128 If the claimant rejected the offer, the 
parties would meet to discuss it, with legal counsel permitted to be present, 129 
although the trust would not increase the offer without new evidence. 130 
120. Id. 
1 2 1 .  id. at 633. Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Da/kon Shield Claimant 's Trust, 53 LAW & CONTEMP PROBS. 
79, I 06 ( 1 990). The payment would be even smaller if the claimant alleged only a derivative 
injury-that is, that the injury (e.g., loss of consortium) was the result of another person's use of the 
device. Id. Roughly 40% of all active claims have been resolved through Option I .  Id. 
122. Feinberg, supra note 12 1 ,  at 106. 
123. Id. at 1 07. 
124. Id. at 106. 
125.  Id. 
126. Id. at 1 07. 
127. Vairo, supra note 1 1 6, at 64 1 .  
128. Id. 
129. Feinberg, supra note 12 1 ,  at 108. 
1 30. See Vairo, supra note 1 1 6, at 642-43. 
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Only after this conference could the claimant litigate or go to binding 
arbitration. 1 3 1 
As in the other causation-based models, claims are brought to the DSCT 
by injured parties . The DSCT differs from the other models, however, in 
that the party paying the awards is also assessing the claims. This system 
relies on independent trustees and court supervision to ensure the DSCT's 
fairness. It also offers more extensive damage awards, as costs are not 
limited to economic harms but also include pain and suffering. The system 
is designed, with its multi-level,  non-adversarial structure, to discourage 
litigation. At the same time, the DSCT's assessment of claims takes place 
in the shadow of tort law, since any offer may be foregone in favor of 
binding arbitration or a. lawsuit. The evidentiary standards employed, 
therefore, mirror those in tort law, as the DSCT is estimating the value of a 
claimant's case in tort. 132 Since the DSCT grew out of litigation against one 
defendant company, questions of allocation are not present in this context. 
The trust was funded by the defendant under consent decree. 133 
5. Summary 
The "real world" models of causation-based compensation programs 
described in the prior section indicate that institutional systems of 
compensation for injury are neither ideologically foreign nor politically 
infeasible. Workers ' Compensation, though undergoing frequent reforms, 
has been and will continue to remain an important fixture in the realm of 
employer-employee relations. The historical forces underlying the Black 
Lung movement may have been idiosyncratic to the particular era and 
occupation, but the legislative success of a no-fault compensation system for 
inj�red miners in the face of medical agnosticism, diagnostic difficulties, and 
1 3 1 .  Id. at 644. 
1 32. The Trust's policy, however, is to rely on its own valuation of the claim-even after the claimant 
independently obtains a jury verdict or arbitration award-to discourage claimants from l itigating. 
The Trust pays only the amount of its own settlement offer, and "holds back" the balance until it 
is clear that sufficient funds exist to pay all valid, non-subordinated claims. See id. at 643. In those 
ways, according to Professor Sobol, the Trust is similar to workers' compensation, with fixed 
amounts for injuries, l imited proof requirements, and discouragement of litigation. See RICHARD 
B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY 3 1 5-16 ( 1 991 ). 
1 33 .  It bears noting that a variety of causation-based, less-than-full-damages compensation plans have 
been adopted in other countries to cover a variety of injury contexts. For instance, drug injury 
compensation schemes are in place in Japan, Germany, and Sweden, all of which exclude coverage 
for pain-and-suffering losses. For a brief description of those programs, see DEWEES, DUFF & 
TREBILCOCK, supra note 65, at 243-44. For a fuller discussion and assessment of those programs, 
see John G. Fleming, Drug Injury Compensation Plans, 30 AMER. J. COMP. L. 297 ( 1 982). 
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a growing worry over unwieldy levels of filings, shows that the possibility 
of alternative compensation is not rendered moot by such difficulties. And 
while the Dalkon Shield Trust and the Childhood Vaccination program may 
differ from our proposed system in that the former involved a trust set up in 
bankruptcy against one specific responsible party and the latter was 
conceived of as a purely compensatory scheme, their administrative systems 
and standards for claimants reveal the viability of an analogous, carefully 
molded system designed to compensate another class of injured consumers 
today-smokers . 
C .  Proposed Causation-Based Systems for Tobacco-Related Harms 
The idea of an causation-based compensation system specifically for 
smoking-related injuries is not new. Over twenty years ago, Donald Gamer 
proposed a system in which welfare agencies could bring no-fault claims 
against cigarette manufacturers to recover direct medical costs and related 
transfer payments, such as social security disability payments. 134 These 
claims could be brought before a special tribunal established solely for the 
purpose and staffed with expert factfinders to manage any complicated 
scientific questions of causation. 135 In effect, Gamer's proposal allowed only 
subrogated claims, as individuals were not eligible to participate. Claimants 
could invoke a rebuttable presumption of causation, if they could 
demonstrate that the victim had smoked for the designated period of time. 136 
If the presumptions were not rebutted, liability would be apportioned among 
manufacturers according to the approximate number of each manufacturer's 
cigarettes that the victim smoked. In addition, there would be a presumption 
that all cigarettes are equally dangerous, a presumption that would be 
rebuttable by a manufacturer's showing that its brand is safer than the 
others. 137 
Since Gamer's article ,  legal scholars have continued to explore the 
notion of a causation-based compensation scheme for tobacco-related 
injuries. Richard Ausness, for example, proposed creating an administrative 
1 34. Donald W. Gamer, Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, 26 EMORY L.J. 269, 3 14  ( 1977). Even a cursory 
read of Professor Gamer's article will reveal numerous similarities between his proposals and those 
discussed in this Article. Although we discovered his work relatively late in our thinking on this 
topic, we are indebted to him for his groundbreaking work in this area. 
135 .  Id. at 3 19. He suggests the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Patent Office Board of 
Appeals as possible models. Id. 
1 36. Id. at 3 15 .  
1 37. Id. at 3 1 6-17.  
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board with rulemaking and adjudicative authority to process tobacco-injury 
claims. 138 As under Garner's system, Ausness' s  board would set 
presumptions of causation, presumptions that might even be irrebuttable for 
certain diseases; and damages would be limited to economic losses. 139 Most 
recently, Paul Lebel advocated a system that would minimize administrative 
costs by incorporating broad, categorical determinations of causation and 
damages. 140 Lebel's  program would be open only to individuals with 
particular diseases and smoking patterns, 141 and those individuals would be. 
allowed to collect only out-of-pocket medical expenses. 142 Lebel would also 
allow a modest benefit to families of smokers who die from smoking-related 
diseases, primarily for the symbolic value. 143 Both Ausness and Lebel would 
finance the payment of damages through an excise tax. 144 
Those earlier proposals were not designed to address all of the 
deterrence and cost-internalization goals that, in our view, should be 
central. 145 The Ausness-Lebel excise tax for instance, would impose costs 
of harm on all manufacturers, irrespective of their causal connection. As we 
have emphasized above, however, the goal of optimal deterrence requires 
that each manufacturer bears that portion of the overall cigarette-caused 
harm that is attributable to that manufacturer 's brands. Only then will 
market forces lead manufacturers to design, produce, and market safer 
cigarettes. And only then will each brand of cigarette fully reflect its 
expected costs, thus leading to optimal activity levels. 
Although none of the actual or proposed causation-based compensation 
systems provide a perfect model for a Smokers' Compensation system, they 
usefully highlight some of the major considerations and trade-offs in 
designing the ideal Smokers' Compensation system. We can draw on these 
1 38. Richard C. Ausness, Compensation/or Smoking-Related Injuries: An Alternative to Strict Liability 
in Tort, 36 WAYNE L. RE V. 1 085, 1 124-25 ( 1990). 
1 39. Id. at 1 127-29. 
140. Paul A. Lebel, Beginning the Endgame: The Search for an Injury Compensation System Alternative 
to Tort Liability for Tobacco Related Harms, 24 N. KY. L. RE V. 457, 474 ( 1997). 
1 4 1 .  Id. at 490. 
142. Id. at 492. 
1 43. Id. 
144. Ausness, supra note 1 38, at 1 1 24-25; Lebel, supra note 140, at 493. 
145. Alternative compensation systems generally have been proposed to serve insurance, administrative 
efficiency, and corrective justice goals. See, e.g., Ausness, supra note 1 38, at 1 088; Rabin, supra 
note 53, at 95 I .  Lebel's and Gamer's proposals are based in part on a cost-internalization premise 
to enhance safety. See Gamer, supra note 1 34, at 277 (goals are removing government subsidies 
of tobacco and encouraging safety); Lebel, supra note 140, at 466 (goals are compensation, 
enhancing safety, administrative efficiency, and cost-internalization). Ausness's goal is corrective 
justice and administrative efficiency. Id. at 1 125 n. 1 78. 
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models as we attempt to meet the deterrence and incentive goals on which 
Smokers' Compensation is predicated while accommodating limitations 
imposed by technical impossibilities and political compromise. 146 
IV. TOW ARD A BLUEPRINT 
If Congress were seriously to consider adopting a Smokers' 
Compensation scheme, we would recommend that it begin by appointing 
some sort of special commission or panel to consider carefully the feasibility 
of the wide range of options available to it. The panel should comprise 
public health experts, epidemiologists, physicians, economists, lawyers, and 
the like, all of whom should have relevant expertise and an understanding of 
the goals of a Smokers ' Compensation system.  The panel would be asked 
to provide detailed answers to the sorts of questions we touch on in this 
Article and to assess whether, overall, the game would be worth the 
candle . 147 The role of this panel might be roughly similar to that of the 
trustees of the Dalkon Shield Claimants ' Trust, who were charged with 
establishing procedures for disbursing the trust to claimants . 148 We see our 
discussion in this section as simply a possible starting point for the analysis 
that such a panel would need to conduct. 
A. Who Decides? 
As the models discussed above demonstrate, there are a variety of 
possible decision-making frameworks available. The choice i:nay turn in 
significant part on how much expertise the decision maker or decision­
making board must have. Just as judges on the Tax Court are typically 
experts in the tax field, the Smokers' Compensation board or administrative 
law judges might be drawn from experts fluent in the language of scientific 
and epidemiological evidence. Alternatively, there may be some advantage 
to mimicking the Vaccine Program by relying on federal courts to implement 
the program. Federal courts, although not specialists in epidemiology, are 
already in place and may be relieved of the threat of.many costly tobacco-
146. Procedural questions may loom large as well. For example, one threshold question is whether a 
Smokers' Compensation system would partially or fully preempt tort law. 
147. For reasons that we discuss below, there may also be a significant role for such a panel once the 
Smokers' C�mpensation system were up and running. 
148. See supra notes 1 18-19 and accompanying text. 
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related lawsuits were a Smokers' Compensation system implemented. 149 On 
the other hand, a potential flood of claims could overwhelm the federal 
judiciary, suggesting the need for an independent adjudicatory apparatus 
along the lines of the workers' compensation systems. 
B .  What Losses Are Covered? 
1 .  Current Practices in Other Causation-Based Compensation Systems 
As indicated above, the measure of damages in all causation-based 
compensation schemes differ significantly from that in tort. Tort law 
provides individualized damages, which include full recovery for medical 
expenses and lost earnings and allow for limitless amounts of pain-and- · 
suffering compensation. 150 In contrast, as we describe in this subsection, 
causation-based compensation systems usually· provide compensation for 
economic losses only15 1  and partial compensation at that. 
a. Medical Expenses 
Causation-based compensation systems usually are most generous with 
respect to medical losses. State workers' compensation laws provide for 
unlimited medical treatment, both in terms of cost and duration, 152 although 
some states put doctors' fees on a schedule . 153 Similarly, the federal 
government allows full recovery of all medical expenses for individuals 
covered by the Federal Employees' Compensation Act and the Longshore 
Act, 154 the Black Lung progrdz\1, and the National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program. 156 The Dalkon Shield Claimants' Trust takes a 
1 49. Also, if the federal judiciary were used, they could be specifically empowered, if necessary, to call 
on the help of scientific experts. See infra notes 274-76. 
1 50. In recent years many states have enacted statutes capping pain-and-suffering damages in tort. See 
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 458-59 ( 1988); Richard B. Schmitt, While 
Congress Debates, States limit Civil lawsuits, WALL ST. J., June 1 6, 1995, at B l .  
1 5 1 .  Efficiency minded scholars typically characterize easily quantified losses, such as medical costs as 
economic. But see Croley & Hanson, supra note 37, at 1 857-61 (arguing that medical losses are 
more accurately characterized as nonpecuniary losses). 
1 52. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 52, at 32-33. 
1 53 .  Id. at 34. 
1 54. Id. at 33. 
1 55. 20 C.F.R. § 725.70l(b) ( 1997). 
1 56. 42 U.S.C.A. 300aa-l 5 ( 1997). Drug compensation programs in other countries also limit damages 
in this way. See supra note 133 .  
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different approach (at least in Option 2, by which most claims are settled) , 157 
providing claimants with scheduled damage awards for particular injuries . 
The DSCT awards thus are based not on actual medical expenditures of 
given claimants, but an average award appropriate to the claimant's 
circumstances. 
b. Disability 
Causation-based compensation schemes are considerably less generous 
with respect to lost wages, since full compensation for lost wages might 
eliminate an injured worker's financial incentive to return to work. 158 To 
accommodate this practical difficulty, in compensating for full disability 
(either temporary or permanent), all state and federal workers' compensation 
systems calculate lost wages at a percentage of pre-injury earnings, usually 
66-2/3 3 .  159 In addition, all of those programs have maximum benefits , 
usually a percentage of the average state weekly wage (ranging from 
66-2/3 3 to 1503 ), and most have minimums. 160 This workers' 
compensation method for calculating compensable lost wages seems well­
accepted. For example, Professor Rabin, in proposing a mass toxics 
compensation system, endorsed a two-thirds-of-wages award with an indexed 
ceiling. 161 
Lost wages resulting from permanent partial disabilities-the loss of a 
body part or hearing-are generally compensated separately from temporary 
full disability. 162 If a worker loses an arm, for example, he receives 
temporary full disability compensation while in convalescence, then lifetime 
1 57. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
1 58. This moral hazard problem is less pronounced with respect to medical expenses, because the injured 
person usually has non-economic incentives to avoid needless medical procedures expenses. Also, 
despite the real differences in economic impact of missing work based on wage levels, some find 
it inequitable that individuals suffering the same injury receive different levels of compensation. 
Richard Ausness makes such an argument in advocating for uniform schedules of compensation for 
tobacco-related injuries. Ausness, supra note 1 38, at 1 1 29. And David Rosenberg earlier made 
such an argument against income-varied damages in mass exposure tort cases. See Rosenberg, 
supra note 36, at 9 18. 
1 59. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 52, at 22-25. Note that disability payments from 
workers' compensation programs are not taxed, so the benefits "replace approximately 90% of net 
wages lost for about 80% of workers who file claims." DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 
65, at 392. 
1 60. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 52, at 22-25. 
16 1 .  Rabin, supra note 53, at 97 1 .  
162. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 52, at 27. Five states deduct the compensation for 
temporary full disability from the compensation for permanent partial disability. Four others cap 
the compensation allowed for temporary full disability. Id. 
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permanent partial disability compensation. The permanent partial 
compensation is usually awarded according to a schedule and is not based on 
wage levels or estimated future wage loss. 163 
c. Death Bene.fits 
While death does produce an economic loss, the nature of the loss is 
nevertheless somewhat different from the economic losses discussed above, 
inasmuch as that economic loss is borne not by the decedent but by the 
decedent's survivors. Most state workers' compensation systems provide 
death benefits to the spouse or dependent children of the decedent in an 
amount equal to compensation for total disability, plus a payment for burial 
expenses. 164 Because this compensation is supposed to replace the wages that 
would have been earned by the decedent, many states phase them out if the 
surviving spouse remarries . '65 The National Vaccine program pays a flat 
award of $250,000 in the event of death, 166 an approach that Professor Lebel 
advocates . 167 
d. Noneconomic Losses 
Workers' compensation and other alternative causation-based 
compensation systems are often said not to compensate injured parties for 
non-economic losses. Indeed, that limit on damages may be the most 
significant difference between administrative alternatives and tort law, where 
damages for pain and suffering are generally available, often for amounts 
exceeding economic damages. The difference may be slightly overstated, 
however, for there are ways in which causation-based schemes can be seen 
to provide de facto compensation for nonpecuniary losses. For example, 
scheduled permanent partial disability compensation payments under 
workers ' compensation are paid to any claimant who fits the description. 
Those payments, ostensibly to compensate for wage loss, are made 
irrespective of the claimant's financial situation. As a consequence, 
claimants who suffer no wage loss may still receive compensation, making 
163.  Eight states base compensation on the degree of impairment. Id. 
164. Id. at29. 
165. Id. at 29-30. 
1 66. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-1 5(a)(2) ( 1997). 
1 67. Lebel, supra note 1 40, at 492. The only death benefits provided under the Dalkon Shield plan 
appear to be for infant deaths, which may be compensated in a fixed amount under Option 2 in the 
amount of$3,200. See Feinberg, supra note 1 2 1 ,  at 1 07; Sobol, supra note 1 32, at 3 13 .  
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the scheduled payments in those circumstances look more like compensation 
for intangible losses associated with permanent partial disability than for loss 
of wages . 168 One compensation program, the National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program, does allow claimants to receive up to $250,000 for 
intangible (pain and suffering) damages at the discretion of the factfinder . 169 
2. The Case for Limiting Smokers ' Compensation Awards to Economic 
Damages 
In this section we argue that, given the policy goals and political 
constraints discussed above, a Smokers' Compensation system should, like 
most of the current cause-based systems, award only economic damages. 
More specifically, the Smokers' Compensation should provide, as do most 
workers' compensation programs, complete, though perhaps scheduled, 
medical benefits, 170 partial but substantial disability benefits, and death 
benefits. Compensation for noneconomic losses, if any, should be scheduled 
and modest. 
The case is strong for treating the other causation-based compensation 
schemes as precedents worthy of emulation. First, by mirroring a workers' 
compensation system, a Smokers' Compensation system would make the 
tobacco industry subject to a type of regulation that would be perceived as 
neither too draconian nor too lenient. Put slightly different, the industry 
168. Cf Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 1 3  
J. LEGAL STUD. 5 1 7, 524 ( 1984) (stating that lump-sum benefits o f  this sort bear "some resemblance 
to compensation for pain and suffering"). A number of jurisdictions, mostly in Canada, now 
explicitly recognize and compensate the non-economic harm suffered by permanent partial 
disability. Saskatchewan and Florida led the way, instituting dual track compensation for such 
disabilities under which they pay physical impairment benefits and lower lost wage benefits than 
they previously had. PAUL c. WEILER, PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY: ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR 
COMPENSATION 3 (report submitted to the Minister of Labour, Province of Ontario, 1986). New 
Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Quebec later adopted similar provisions. Id. at 4. Advocates argue 
that the significant effect on the victim's life outside the workplace ought to be compensated, even 
if it is non-economic. Id. at 3 .  
1 69. 42  U.S.C.A. § 300aa-15(a)(4) (1997). 
1 70. A more open question is whether monitoring costs prior to manifestation of disease ought to be 
covered. To the extent a smoker legitimately incurs additional expense in anticipation of smoking­
related diseases, those costs are caused by cigarettes. Rabin would want to cover the monitoring 
expenses in his proposed system, although he acknowledges that the pragmatic difficulties given 
a large universe of the potentially injured (all exposed to the toxin) might make reimbursement of 
these expenses politically unacceptable. See Rabin, supra note 53, at 973; see also David 
Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71  
N.Y.U. L .  REv. 210, 220 n.22 ( 1 996) (listing a number of  lawsuits in  which plaintiffs have sought 
to recover medical monitoring costs); id. at 234-35 (discussing whether and when medical 
monitoring or mitigation claims are necessary). 
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would be subject to the very same sort of regulation to which other 
industries, seeking tort law protection, have been subject. Second, by 
deferring somewhat to precedent, the Federal government would be sending 
a clearer deterrence signal that would go well beyond the tobacco industry. 171 
The case is made considerably stronger when one recognizes that 
commonly made arguments against holding cigarette manufacturers liable in 
tort would lose most of their force if damages were limited as we have 
described. 172 One major critique of the tort system is that it is far too slow 
and expensive to adminjster and that it subjects manufacturers to liability for 
unpredictable and lottery-like damage awards . The Proposed Resolution, for 
example, emphasizes these themes,  calling the civil actions now pending 
"complex, slow-moving, expensive and burdensome,"  and claiming that 
" [o]nly national legislation offers the prospect of a swift, fair, equitable and 
consistent result. " 173 The Proposed Resolution purportedly reflects the "need 
to avoid the cost, expense, uncertainty and inconsistency associated with [the 
current] protracted litigation. " 174 Presumably, much of the perceived 
problem stems from the fact that tort damages include pain-and-suffering 
damages and the assumptions that those damages can be costly to prove and 
calculate and tend to be more variable and unpredictable than economic 
damages. Clearly, one benefit of a Smokers' Compensation scheme is that 
it would be administratively cheaper and significantly more predictable and 
consistent than civil litigation, especially if liability is limited to just 
economic damages. 175 It may be worth noting that scholars and 
1 7 1 .  See generally Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1302--04 (describing the potential general 
deterrence benefits of such government policies). 
172. We want to be very clear here that we believe that most of the arguments against holding tobacco 
manufacturers liable are either wrong or vastly overstated. In this section, we will focus on only one 
type of counterargument-that is, again, showing how many of the anti-liability arguments are at least 
partially contingent upon an assumption that liability would be for both economic and noneconomic 
damages. 
1 73 .  Proposed Resolution, supra note 4, at 4. 
1 74. Id. There is considerable irony to this critique of tort liability in light of the facts that the liability 
costs of tobacco manufacturers had, at least prior to the proposed settlement, long been consistently 
low and that the gargantuan administrative costs of litigating a cigarette claim has always been 
disproportionately attributable to the tobacco industry's spare-no-expense legal strategies. Another 
difficulty with the critique it that manufacturers of virtually every other product in our economy 
have all been subject to the tort system, notwithstanding those putative problems, and providing 
special tort immunity to cigarette manufacturers on those grounds is hard to justify. 
1 75. This is true in large part because there is no need to measure the very difficult-to-measure pain-and­
suffering damages as is done in the majority of tort cases. On the other hand, the costs of 
measuring pain-and-suffering damages might be reduced through the use of some sort of injury­
specific grid or schedule of damages for nonpecuniary losses associated with different sorts of 
smoking-related illnesses. For a description of a system in which pain-and-suffering damages were 
averaged and scheduled, see David Rosenberg, Scheduling in Mass Exposure Cases, I COURTS, 
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commentators have rarely complained about the costs of making damages 
calculations in workers ' compensation proceedings. 176 Of course, 
administrative costs might be lowered further by, for example, awarding 
non-individualized economic damages according to injury type. 177 
Limiting compensation to economic damages would also address the 
objections of critics of cigarette-manufacturer liability who believe that 
expanded liability and compensation would have adverse incentive effects on 
consumers . For instance, some commentators assert that a system that 
compensates smokers for smoking-related injuries would remove from 
smokers much of the responsibility for their own actions. 178 The concern, 
which we do not share, 179 seems to be that the promise of compensation will 
HEALTH Ser. & L. 335 ( 1991). As we argue below, however, there may be several reasons for not 
awarding non pecuniary losses even if they were easily measured. Many efficiency-oriented scholars 
have argued that nonpecuniary-loss damages are undesirable because they force consumers to 
purchase a type of insurance that they do not demand. Some of those scholars have concluded that 
the pain-and-suffering component of tort damages or no-fault compensation should therefore be 
lowered if not eliminated. See, e.g., DEWEES, DUFF & TREBILCOCK, supra note 65, at 393. See 
generally Croley & Hanson, Nonpecuniary Costs, supra note 37 (reviewing and then criticizing the 
conventional economic wisdom on pain-and-suffering damages). 
1 76. Limiting damages in this way may reduce administrative costs further by encouraging collectivized 
subrogation claims instead of individualized direct claims. Scholars have begun to take seriously 
the possibility that insurers would use subrogation rights more often in personal injury contexts and 
to identify the potential benefits of this sort of arrangement. See generally Croley & Hanson, 
Nonpecuniary Costs, supra note 37, at 18 12, 1 867-71 (describing the role the subrogation rights 
currently play and the role that they could play in tort cases). See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Of End 
Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REv. 695, 
729-30 (1 989) (describing some of the benefits including "that the insurer could efficiently 
aggregate claims dispersed over time and territory as well as the capital necessary to fund adequate 
presentation of the case. Agency problems between class members and their counsel would also be 
eliminated by transferring ownership of claims to the insurer"); David Rosenberg, The Uncertainties 
of Assigned Shares Tort Compensation: What We Pon 't Know Can Hurt Us, 6 RISK ANALYSIS 363 
( 1986) (making similar observations); Joseph B. Treaster, State Farm Lawsuit Says Ford Hid Risk 
of Fire in Vehicles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2 1 ,  1998, at A l  (describing an actual case in which insurer is 
suing defendant on behalfofall of its insureds); cf Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured 
Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REv. 383 ( 1989) (making a case for allowing a market in unmatured tort 
claims, which is, in essence, a case for allowing insurers to exercise subrogation rights for the full 
value of tort claims). 
177. See infra notes 1 88-94 and accompanying text. Many workers' compensation programs provide 
a schedule of benefits for certain injuries. For instance, if a worker loses sight in one eye in a work 
related injury, then the worker might receive a pre-specified amount, even if the partial blindness 
does not create any disabil ity. DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL REsPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 873-74 (2d ed. 1993). There may be 
another sort of administrative-cost benefit of l imiting damages. That is, because other causation­
based systems limit damages, it would be simpler for policymakers to do the same so that they can 
mimic and learn from the programs already in existence. 
178. See infra notes 299-303 and accompanying text; Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1 350. 
1 79. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1 18 1-1262. 
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give rise to what economists call "moral hazard"-that is, smokers would 
engage in greater quantities of risky activity than they would were they 
required to pay for all of the costs of their decisions . On the other hand, 
other commentators claim that just the opposite would occur. Their 
argument seems to be that because smokers are already aware of the risks 
and already take those risks into account when purchasing each pack of 
cigarettes; forcing smokers to pay a higher price for cigarettes that itself 
reflects the risks of smoking, will overdeter consumers from smoking. 
Smokers will internalize the risks once when deciding to buy another pack 
of cigarettes and then again when purchasing the pack at the increased 
price. ISO 
We have argued elsewhere that neither the under deterrence argument 
nor the overdeterrence argument poses as significant a problem as scholars 
have suggested. 1s1 But the point that we want to make here is that, even if 
we accept the basic premises of the two arguments, ex post compensation 
will create neither an under deterrence problem nor an overdeterrence 
problem as long as damages are limited to economic damages. There are 
two reasons under deterrence is not a problem. First, where only economic 
damages are paid, the threat of noneconomic damages will more clearly 
encourage smokers to take appropriate precautions. 182 Second, even if there 
is some residual moral hazard problem, that problem would exist under the 
current regime anyway, inasmuch as many smoking-related losses are 
already covered by some sort of insurance. 1s3 Thus, a Smokers' 
1 80. See id. at 1232-36. 
1 8 1 .  One major flaw in each argument can be easily glimpsed by placing the arguments side-by-side as 
we �ave here: each incentive effect offsets the other. That is, if consumers were required to pay in 
the price of the cigarettes that they purchase a de facto insurance premium for coverage against 
cigarette-caused harms, then they would not escape responsibility for their decisions to smoke. See 
id. at 1 279-80, 1350-5 1 .  Similarly, insofar as consumers are compensated ex post for smoking­
caused harms, they will not be overdeterred. For a fuller treatment of this argument, see id. at 
1274-78. 
1 82. Cf Hanson & Logue, Insurance Externa/ity, supra note 37, at 1 87 (explaining that the threat of. 
nonpecuniary losses will help ensure that consumers take care, even where nonpecuniary-loss 
damages are awarded). Ausness, supra note 1 38, at 1 129 (suggesting that disallowing 
nonpecuniary-loss damages may be an appropriate way of acknowledging some responsibility on 
the part of smokers). 
1 83. See Hanson & Logue, Insurance Externa/ity, supra note 37, at 1 72-73; see also Robert L. Rabin, 
No-Fault Compensation for Tobacco-Related Disease, Remarks at the Conference on the So-Called 
Global Tobacco Settlement 16, Univ. of Wisconsin Law School (Oct. 1 6, 1997) (transcript on file 
with authors). Even if injured smokers were entitled to compensation for all pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary losses, the ex ante moral hazard problem would not be very significant. Smokers 
would have to pay for the insurance with each pack of cigarette purchased and there may be little 
in the way of care-level precautions that consumers can take (or fail to take). See Hanson & Logue, 
supra note 3, at 1280. 
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Compensation program would not create a problem, at worst it would 
reproduce it. 
Similarly, limiting damages to economic losses would, again for two 
reasons, largely overcome any overdeterrence problem. First, insofar as 
consumers anticipate that a Smokers' Compensation system would 
compensate for smoking-caused economic harms, the overdeterrence 
problem goes away. 184 Second, smokers would understand that the additional 
part of the price would reflect not a loss, but a de facto first-party insurance 
premium. That is, the assumption that consumers are well informed with 
respect to the economic risks is not relevant inasmuch as smokers are able 
to externalize those risks to those who finance public and private insurance 
arrangements that typically end up paying for the bulk of smoking-caused 
economic costs. Thus, a Smokers' Compensation program would not create 
an overdeterrence problem because consumer information with respect to 
those risks does not affect consumer behavior even under the current regime. 
There are several other potentially significant benefits of limiting 
liability to economic damages, or perhaps even to just a portion of economic 
damages . For instance, while the economic damages may be substantial, 185 
they may not be so significant as to bankrupt the entire industry. 186 
Relatedly, they will also be less likely to stimulate a robust black market in 
cigarettes. 187 
The administrative cost savings of limiting compensation to economic 
damages could be dramatically increased if even economic damages were 
scheduled. Just as workers' compensation systems establish grids by which 
victims of permanent partial disabilities receive pre-determined amounts, 188 
Smokers' Compensation could base damages on the average cost of a given 
injury or combination of injuries . Thus, if the average cost of treating, for 
example, a middle-aged, female victim of laryngeal cancer189 is $100, any 
such claimant would receive $100, even if her actual expenditures were $50 
or $150. If the schedule is set accurately to the average treatment costs, the 
lack of individualized damages may not affect deterrence. 190 Although in any 
1 84. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1274-78. 
1 85. See infra notes 292-98 and accompanying text [Bankruptcy Concerns section]. 
1 86. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1 305 & n.579. Cf Ausness, supra note 1 38, at 1 129. 
1 87. For a discussion of whether and to what extent the black-market problem would be exacerbated by 
an ex post incentive-based form of cigarette regulation, see Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 
1298-1301 .  
1 88. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text. 
1 89. Depending on the variation in treatment costs across demographic boundaries, it might be advisable 
to create a greater or fewer number of categorical distinctions. 
190. See supra note 36. 
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given case, manufacturers may be paying more than or less than actual 
damages, in aggregate, they would pay the same amount for the laryngeal 
cancer cases they caused as they would if each victim were paid actual 
costs . 191 
Perhaps counterintuitively, for several reasons, scheduled damages may 
well be preferred by claimaints purely on compensation grounds-even by 
those claimaints who experience above-average losses. First, as David 
Rosenberg has emphasized, removing the burden of proving the value of 
one's loss could more than offset the difference between what high-damages 
claimants would receive in an individualized system and the statistical 
average they would receive under a scheduled system. 192 So, returning to the 
previous example, if the costs of demonstrating damages is more than $50, 
even a high-damage claimaint is better off receiving the average $ 100. 
Moreover, that a schedule would provide averaged, rather than 
individualized, compensation would not be a problem from the perspective 
of most likely claimants under a Smokers' Compensation system-that is, 
private and public insurers . Because of the law of large numbers, total 
insurance pay-outs should approximate averaged damages (e .g . ,  $100 per 
insurance pay-out) , which is precisely what a scheduled system would 
compensate them. Furthermore, as Bruce Hay and David Rosenberg have 
argued, even individual claimants may, at least from an ex ante perspective, 
prefer a regime that provides averaged rather than individualized 
compensation. 193 They write: 
For the prospective [claimant] who does not know the quality his case will 
have, an averaging system offers the same expected recovery as an 
individualizing system. If he were concerned only with the expected 
recovery . . .  , therefore, he would simply be indifferent between the two 
systems. Averaging, however, tends to reduce both the expense and the 
1 9 1 .  If treatment costs of diseases caused by different cigarettes were not consistent-if, for example, 
certain brands caused a particularly virulent form of cancer that systematically cost more to treat 
than the treatment costs of cancer caused by other brands-then averaging damages may partially 
undermine the goals of Smokers' Compensation. Assume that Brand X caused an especially 
ferocious cancer while Brand Y caused the same disease, but a less intractable version. Although 
claimants that smoked either brand would collect the average cost, Brand X's customers would 
actually account for more of those costs than Brand Y. Thus the manufacturer of Brand X would 
be underdeterred while the manufacturer of Brand Y would be overdeterred. To put the point more 
broadly, a damages schedule will need to be accurate (and frequently updated) in terms of how 
diseases are categorized and in terms of the compensation levels allowed for each category. 
1 92. See David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 
62 IND. L.J. 561 ,  572-73 ( 1987). 
1 93 .  See generally Bruce L. Hay & David Rosenberg, The Individual Justice of Averaging (unpublished 
manuscript on file with authors). 
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riskiness associated with [bringing a claim], and for these reasons will often 
be strictly preferable to individualization in the eyes of the prospective 
[claimant] . The only way to realize the benefits is to make averaging 
compulsory, because ex post-once [claimants] know the quality of their 
case-they will have an incentive to avoid averaging. Yet transaction costs 
frequently prevent [claimants] from agreeing, ex ante, to a regime of 
compulsory averaging. Hence the argument for compulsory averaging 
imposed by the legal system. 194 
In sum, were a Smokers' Compensation program to mandate averaging of 
compensation through a scheduling approach, not only would administrative 
costs be reduced but also potential claimants may be made better off. 195 
In the Smokers' Compensation context, scheduling damages would mean 
that claimants would have to prove only the existence of their injury as well 
as causation. As we will discuss more fully below, there are options for 
collectivizing the causation inquiry through such mechanisms as evidentiary 
presumptions and proportional liability. 196 In tandem, these devices could 
conceivably streamline the claim procedure to a point where claims may be 
filed by mail without sacrificing the deterrence objectives of Smokers' 
Compensation. 197 
194. Id. at 2 (footnote omitted). They conclude that everything should be averaged-including elements 
such as causation-except as deterrence or marginal-utility-of-wealth considerations otherwise 
require. See id. at Part IV.B.2. David Rosenberg is of the opinion that we may have, in light of the 
Hay and Rosenberg analysis, erred in favor of recommending more individualization (and less 
averaging) than is appropriate given the goal of detterence. See Memo from David Rosenberg 
(March 19, 1998) (on file with authors). We are inclined to disagree, but, if wrong, we would 
happily embrace the conclusion that a Smokers' Compensation system could be made even less 
costly to administer than we have described. 
195. Additional benefits of scheduling damages are that the increased predictability of such a system is 
likely to make Smokers' Compensation more attractive to manufacturers, and scheduled damages 
would encourage claimants to bring claims early in the disease cycle. Whereas in an individualized 
system a claimant might have an incentive to let costs mount before bringing claims, a scheduled 
award would create an incentive to bring claims as soon as possible. To the extent that accelerated 
claims lead to more preventative care, the total costs of treatment are likely to shrink. Moreover, 
accelerated claims mean less time between manufacture and liability, perhaps enhancing the 
deterrence effect. Finally reducing the length of time between smoking and claim might ease certain 
factual inquiries, such as which brands were smoked and for how long. 
196. See infra notes 222-34 and accompanying text. 
1 97. Here, as elsewhere, one would expect reductions in accuracy as the price of administrative savings. 
The question for policymakers is whether that price in accuracy outweighs the savings 
administrative costs. We would imagine that a strong case can be made for scheduling most 
damages. 
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C. Who Can Bring a Claim? 
We have already argued that the universe of Smokers' Compensation 
claimants should be limited to smokers themselves, their estates, and their 
subrogated insurers (private or public) . This limitation suggests the following 
question: Under this approach, what class of potential claimants would be 
excluded from bringing a claim? 
The most obvious class would be victims of environmental tobacco 
smoke ["ETS"], what used to be called passive or second-hand smoke. One 
could imagine a Smokers' Compensation system that would allow ETS 
victims to bring claims. However, given our interest in deterrence rather 
than in compensation, and given the administrative-cost problems that ETS 
claims would present, we would not recommend allowing ETS claims. As 
for the deterrence concern, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to allocate ETS damages among manufacturers on anything other than a 
market-share basis (or an ex ante relative-risk basis) . Therefore, one of the 
principal reasons for preferring an ex post incentive-based approach to, say, 
an ex ante approach (such as an excise tax) does not exist with respect to 
ETS exposure. In addition, if the system were made available to ETS 
claimants, administrative costs would soar, as the sheer number of claimants 
would rise dramatically. So ETS claimants would probably be excluded. 198 
Of those smoking victims whom we would allow to bring a Smokers' 
Compensation claim, perhaps the claimants that need the most justification 
are the insurers of the smokers. Under the system we propose, insurers 
would also be allowed to bring claims to recover for benefits they have paid 
to smokers or to families of smokers. By " insurer" here we mean not only 
private health, disability, and life insurers, but also federal and state 
198. If, however, the Smokers' Compensation system were thought to be a desirable means of 
compensating those harmed by smoking (and not just a deterrence mechanism), the additional 
administrative costs of such a system might be worth incurring. Moreover, it should be noted that 
allowing ETS claims, if done in tandem with �ubstantial limitations on the types of damages that 
could be recovered, would not necessarily break the bank. For example, we might allow claims to 
be brought by nonsmokers who suffer from lung cancer or emphysema and who can demonstrate 
that they work in a setting in which smoking is allowed and have worked in that setting for a given 
number of years,Jocumented by employment records. Or we might allow ETS claims to be brought 
by family members of smokers. Again, however, because these costs would not be readily allocable 
among manufacturers on a brand-specific causal basis, the deterrence benefit of Smokers' 
Compensation (over an excise tax) would be lost. In addition, even if Smokers' Compensation were 
an effective means of internalizing ETS-related harms, the efficiency case for imposing those harms 
on cigarette manufacturers instead of, say, on employers or on owners of public buildings, is 
somewhat less strong that is the efficiency case for imposing the costs to smokers themselves (and 
the costs to their insurers) on cigarette companies. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1 3 1 2-15 .  
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governments acting as health, disability, and life insurers through programs 
such as Medicare, Medicaid, and the like . Allowing insurers to recover a 
Smokers' Compensation claim would be comparable (although perhaps not 
identical) to what is done currently by many private insurers-by way of the 
doctrine of subrogation-when their policyholders suffer insured losses for 
which some third party can be held legally responsible. 199 The justification 
for allowing insurers to recover under a quasi-subrogation theory is 
straightforward: Doing so ensures that the costs of relevant smoking-related 
harms ultimately will be borne by the manufacturers (and, through the price 
mechanism, ultimately by smokers), rather than by the nonsmokers in the 
insurance pools . Thus, first-party health, disability, and life insurance 
premiums (or, in the case of Medicare and Medicaid, the costs of those 
programs) would fall-just as cigarette prices would rise.200 
Another benefit of allowing insurers to bring claims is that it may 
significantly simplify the administration of the Smokers' Compensation 
program. Insurers would have an incentive to aggregate claims in the most 
cost-effective manner and to stream-line the process of administering and 
settling claims. Because the insurers would be operating in the shadow of 
the Smokers' Compensation regime, even the aggregated claims and mass 
settlements (if they occur) would still send the brand-specific causal message 
to manufacturers (if it is cost-effective to do so). In other words, the 
manufacturers whose cigarettes are relatively more dangerous, and hence 
give rise to relatively large or numerous claims, would be forced to accept 
199. See generally ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES, LEOAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 219-52 (1988). 
200. The doctrine of subrogation is typically defended, by courts and commentators, as a necessary 
means of protecting the time-honored insurance-law principle of"indemnity." See id. at 220-2 1 .  
This principle, which serves as the basis for a number of insurance-law doctrines (such as the 
"insurable interest" doctrine), holds that "insurance contracts shall confer a benefit no greater in 
value than the loss suffered by an insured." Id. at 135. And this principle of indemnity, in tum, 
is based on the idea that we do not want insurance contracts to produce net gains for the insureds, 
but rather we want them only to cover losses. Id. at 1 36-39; Croley & Hanson, Nonpecuniary 
Costs, supra note 37, at 1854. That idea can be justified on consumer-sovereignty grounds-that is, 
most purchasers of insurance, being risk averse after all (at least with respect to the risks for which 
they seek insurance), want to shift the risk of loss from themselves to their insurers. To allow 
policyholders double recovery in the event of an insured loss would be tantamount to allowing 
gambling, which is not thought to be the reason that people enter into insurance contracts. What 
is more, to the extent the insured had control over the probability or magnitude of the insured loss, 
the potential for double recovery could produce a significant moral hazard problem. See KEETON 
& Wm1ss, supra note 199, at 1 36-39. Without the principle of indemnity and the doctrine of 
subrogation (whether provided exp I icitly in the insurance contract or implied by a court), insureds 
would be able to recover twice for some harms, a possibil ity that would produce an increase in 
premiums that most risk-averse insureds would prefer not to pay. 
1998] Smokers' Compensation 565 
relatively expensive deals with subrogated first-party insurers, thus sending 
the desired deterrence message. 
D.  How Does One Prove a Smoking-Related Injury? 
Questions of causation arise at three levels. First is the question of 
general causation: could a given harm have been caused by smoking 
cigarettes? If the answer to that question is affirmative, the system must then 
determine whether, in the given case, tobacco actually did cause the harm 
(claimant 's specific causation) and, if so, which brand or brands of cigarettes 
actually' caused the harm (brand-specific causation). In this section we look 
at questions of whether smoking generally caused a claimant's injury, that 
is , general and claimant-specific causation. In the next section we will 
examine how to establish brand-specific causation. 
1 .  General Causation: Could Smoking Have Caused the Injury? 
The question of general causation may logically be subsumed within the 
specific causation inquiry. After all, in answering the question, "did 
smoking cause the claimant's injury?, "  the tribunal would also be addressing 
the more general question of whether such an injury could possibly result 
from smoking. Typically, however, causation-based compensation systems 
separate the two inquiries to reduce administrative costs . 201 General 
causation serves as a gatekeeper, only admitting plausible claims. 
a. Thresholds 
As a limited-purpose system designed to compensate only certain harms, 
the first inquiry of a Smokers' Compensation board would likely be to 
determine whether cigarette smoking could have caused the injury claimed. 
The decision-maker would have to establish whether the claim has sufficient 
merit to warrant a hearing. Claims might fail that test and thus be non­
compensable because the type of injury is not considered smoking-related, 
or because the claimant's smoking history is not considered likely to have 
resulted in the injury alleged. To minimize administrative costs, these 
standards may be pre-established as thresholds. The system may compensate 
201 .  Examples include the limitation of the Childhood Vaccine Compensation Program to certain 
diseases, see supra note I 56 and accompanying text, and the presumptions of the Black Lung 
program, see supra note I 55 and accompanying text. 
566 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 22 
only for certain diseases that are considered more than likely to result from 
smoking.202 Only people who have smoked a given number of packs per day 
and a given number of years might be eligible to bring claims. To increase 
the accuracy of the system, the thresholds may vary depending on the injury. 
A science panel might establish, for instance, that some diseases are likely 
to develop after five years of smoking while others arise only after ten years . 
Similarly, claims for certain diseases with known, constant latency periods 
might also be barred until a given period of time has passed. 
Because such thresholds will bar non-conforming claims, the levels at 
which they are set will greatly shape the system. The question of thresholds 
makes plain the tension between accuracy and cost. The cheapest option 
would be to set very strict thresholds so that only presumptively valid claims 
are allowed. If, for example, only claims by twenty-year smokers with lung 
cancer or emphysema were heard, the subsequent decision as to whether this 
claimant was injured by smoking would be simplified. The trade-off, of 
course, is that a large number of would-be claimants injured by tobacco 
products would not be compensated, and the deterrence objective of the 
system would be significantly compromised. Greater accuracy might mean 
a large variety of thresholds, depending on the amount smoked, injury, 
demographic factors, or other considerations. It might mean simply a low 
threshold that only weeds out obviously frivolous claims. As in crafting 
other aspects of the system, the threshold level should be set based on 
considerations of the marginal cost of increasing accuracy and the political 
realities discussed above. 
b. Smoking History 
A Smokers' Compensation system could, just as our current tort system 
may, ·create incentives for people diagnosed with diseases that are often 
smoking-related to overstate the extent to which they smoke. By 
exaggerating his or her smoking history, a claimant may be able to overcome 
certain evidentiary thresholds or enjoy certain evidentiary presumptions that 
the system might employ. Our preliminary investigations suggest, however, 
that problem is unlikely to be significant. Smokers and former smokers 
202. Cf Frank J. Vandall, Rea/locating the Costs of Smoking: The Application of Absolute Liability to 
Cigarette Manufacturers, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 405, 423 (199 1 )  (proposing a presumption of causation 
with respect only to cancer of the lung, larynx, oral cavity, and esophagus within a system of 
absolute liability for cigarette manufacturers). 
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would likely be able to establish their smoking histories credibly and 
relatively inexpensively. 203 
The effects of long-term smoking often manifest themselves in ways that 
can be identified through reasonably straightforward medical tests . For 
example, long-term smokers often develop Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary 
Disease (COPD),204 and even many short-term and medium-term smokers 
develop symptoms related to but less serious than those of COPD. COPD 
is a clinical term for patients with chronic bronchitis , emphysema, or a 
mixture of the two.205 Pulmonary function testing with spirometry to 
measure lung volume is a simple, inexpensive, and effective preliminary 
indicator of COPD and other smoking-caused reductions in lung function. 
The so-called "FEV1 test, "  which is a measure of forced expiratory volume 
per one second (the amount of air exhaled during the first second of 
expiration), shows smokers to have a greatly reduced volume.206 COPD's 
symptoms sometime emerge in the early stages of smoking, but typically 
develop fully over the course of twenty to thirty years, worsening over 
time. 207 Smoking cessation can only partially, and usually insignificantly 
203. Put differently, manufacturers, with the aid of witnesses or medical tests, could, where appropriate, 
rebut any overstated or fraudulent smoking-history claims. 
204. Se� DAVID DAIL & SAMUEL P. HAMMAR, PULMONARY PATHOLOGY 835 (2d ed. 1 994). Smokers also 
develop brown pigmented macrophages (which are blood cells that clear particles from the lungs). 
The small airways have "prominent intraluminal collections of sl ightly pigmented alveolar 
macrophages ("smokers macrophages") which are crowded into tight clusters. See Anthony A. Gal 
& Michael N. Koss, Differential Diagnosis, in PATHOLOGY: PULMONARY DISORDERS 40 (Jonathan 
I. Epsten, ed. 1997). 
205. See KiusTINE NAPIER ET AL., THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND HEALTH, CIGARETTES: WHAT 
THE WARNING LABEL DOESN'T TELL You 9 ( 1996); see also id. ("Cigarette smoking is the single 
most important cause of both chronic bronchitis and emphysema; it accounts for almost all cases 
of both."). 
206. See JOHN B. WEST, PULMONARY PATHOPHYSIOLOGY 68-77 (1 992); see also id. at 71 ("[S]ome 
physicians regard this prolonged time as a useful simple bedside index of obstruction."). In 
addition, more involved inert gas elimination techniques can also be used to test ventilation and gas­
exchange abnormalities. Id. 
207. See GERALD L. BAUM & EMANUEL WOLINSKY, TEXTBOOK OF PULMONARY DISEASES 1004 (1994) 
("Functional abnormalities ·have consistently been demonstrated in survey studies in male and 
female smokers of all ages. The extent of these abnormalities worsens with advancing age and 
increased tobacco consumption."). 
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reverse the effects of the disease .208 Thus, damages from years of smoking 
are often evident from spirometric tests . 209 
In addition to spirometric tests (and other simple medical tests, including 
urine tests, blood tests, and chest x-rays) , which can be administered at the 
time a claim is made, claimants can also be required to provide corroborative 
evidence in the form of, say, affidavits from doctors, friends, co-workers 
and others who may have been in a position to observe the claimant's 
smoking habit in years prior to the claim being made.210 In sum, it appears 
that there may be reasonably reliable and inexpensive ways to verify a 
claimant's alleged smoking history. It is unsurprising, therefore, that 
establishing a claimant's smoking history has generally not posed a 
significant source of dispute in tort suits brought by smokers against cigarette 
manufacturers . 21 1 
2. Claimant-Specific Causation: Did Smoking Cause the Injury? 
Of course, a determination that smoking could have caused any 
compensable injury does not imply that, in the given case, smokin.g did cause 
the injury. Although smoking gives rise to several signature diseases (e .g . , 
lung cancer, oral cancer, emphysema),212 some smoking-related diseases 
208. See id. at 1012 ("Smoking cessation does not result in appreciable improvements in lung function 
in most patients . . . .  Improvement in lung function was detected by spirometry and by the single- . 
breath nitrogen test after both reduction and the cessation of smoking. While statistically 
significant, the average magnitude of the change was quite small. These findings were confirmed 
in another study of similar design, and they indicate that the reversible component of cigarette 
smoke-induced lung injury is relatively slight, even in the earlier stages ofCOPD."). 
209. See id. It might be argued that such symptoms are often caused by air pollution. However, the 
evidence indicates that air pollution would be a rare and minor contributor to such symptoms as 
compared to smoking. In the words of two physicians who have studied the matter, "personal 
pollution (cigarette smoking) is more than a hundred times worse than general air pollution in terms 
of simple particulates." DAIL & HAMMAR, supra note 206, at 834. Furthermore, "outdoor air 
pollution levels in most Western cities are probably not high enough to cause . . .  clinically 
significant impairment of lung function except in persons with unusual susceptibility." JOHN F. 
MURRAY & JAY A. NADEL, TEXTBOOK OF RESPIRATORY MEDICINE 1271  (1 994). Of course, if 
manufacturers believe that pollution, and not smoking, is the cause of such symptoms in a particular 
claimant, they may be given the opportunity to rebut any presumption created by the tests with the 
use of other types of evidence. 
2 1 0. A Smokers' Compensation system could certainly adjust compensation levels a<;cording to what 
evidentiary thresholds a claimant is able to clear. 
21 1 .  Interview of Richard Daynard (November 17, 1997); Norwood Wilner (November 1 7, 1997). 
2 12. See supra note 47. 
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have more than one potential cause.213 In trying to assign responsibility 
among potential causes, there are several standards that the system might 
invoke: the "arising from" standard borrowed from workers' compensation 
law, the preponderance of the evidence standard familiar from tort law, and 
the "probabilistic causation" approach that many scholars have 
recommended in contexts where causation takes place, if at all, at the 
molecular level. The choice of standard of specific causation required 
implicates the likelihood of bringing a successful claim and thus the 
effectiveness of the system as well as the administrative costs . 214 
a. "Arising from " 
Under workers' compensation's "arising from" standard, a smoker who 
could show that smoking was a contributing factor to her disease would 
prove specific causation. Workers' compensation, which evolved in 
response to industrial accidents, has struggled to account for occupational 
disease. In many cases, it is not at all clear that a worker exposed to toxic 
fumes develops cancer as a result of that exposure rather than genetics or 
environmental toxins. Long latency periods complicate the inquiry. 
Workers' compensation systems generally consider a disease "occupational" 
if the victim was likely to have contracted it due to the nature of his work. 215 
The distinctive nature of the work may be in the type of risk to which it 
exposes workers, such as those working around toxic chemicals, or the 
degree to which workers must face everyday risks, such as a worker 
handling ice all day. 216 A disease which may be common may nevertheless 
become occupational if the employment facilitates its transmission. For 
example, a telephone operator who contracted tuberculosis qualified for 
workers' compensation because it was found that the close-fitting mouthpiece 
she used at work contributed to her contraction of the disease .217 The 
213 .  In addition to the signature diseases, smoking is known to be a significant contributor to cancer of 
the bladder, kidney, pancreas, stomach, and cervix. Michael C. Fiore, Cigarelle Smoking: A 
Clinical Guide to Assessment and Treatment, 76 MED. CLINICS OF N. AM. 305, 3 1 8-22 ( 1992). The 
causal relationship between smoking and heart disease was first established nearly 60 years ago, in 
1 940, by the Mayo Clinic. Carl E. Bartecchi et al., The Human Costs of Tobacco Use, 330 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 907, 907 ( 1994). Nearly one-fifth of deaths from cardiovascular disease are 
attributable to smoking according to the Office of Technology Assessment. Id. 
2 14. For a general discussion of the deterrence concerns raised by choices among burdens of proof, see 
Kaplow, supra note 36, at 358-{;2 (describing how choosing burden of proof so as to optimize 
deterrence is a function of, among other things, the social cost of sanctions). 
2 1 5 .  1 ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS. COMPENSATION LAW 7-100 (desk ed. 1976 & Supp. 1997). 
2 1 6. Id. at 7-1 1 3  to 7-1 14. 
2 1 7. Id. at 7-1 07. 
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employment need not be the sole or even dominant cause, so long as it 
contributes to development of the disease .218 
Following this standard theoretically would allow a great number of 
smokers to collect damages for their injuries.219 A claimant would need only 
show that her injury was in some way furthered by smoking to recover fully 
through the Smokers' Compensation system. For example, the medical 
evidence indicates rather unequivocally that smoking contributes to the 
likelihood of contracting heart disease .220 Given that evidence, most long­
time smokers could likely show that their heart disease was complicated or 
accelerated by smoking, and, thus, under an "arising from" standard, receive 
full compensation. Such a system carries the risk of "overdeterrence, "  in 
that tobacco companies may end up paying for injuries they did not cause, 
or at least that they alone did not cause. If so, this approach would constitute 
a policy decision to make cigarette manufacturers subsidize certain health 
care costs of smokers. Some smokers would be getting an extra benefit from 
the tobacco companies-payment for non-smoking-related injuries-in addition 
to compensation for their smoking-related injuries. As we explain below, 
however, it may be possible to reduce compensation in such a way as to 
minimize the overdeterrence (or subsidy) problem. 
b. Preponderance of the evidence 
Under the traditional cause-in-fact standard found in tort law, smokers 
would have to show that tobacco was more likely than not the cause of their 
injury. This is sometimes called the "preponderance of the evidence" rule.  
Whereas the "arising from" standard would allow any claim in which 
tobacco played a role, a preponderance of the evidence standard would raise 
the bar. Tobacco would have to be a dominant cause of the disease rather 
than simply a contributing factor. In cases such as mass toxic torts and 
tobacco-related harms, the reliance on statistical evidence means that a strong 
preponderance rule, requiring "particularistic proof" of causation as to the 
2 1 8. Id. at 7-124. 
2 19. In theory, anyway. Despite this apparently liberal standard, the workers' compensation system does 
not get high marks for responding to occupational disease. The American Law Institute Reporters' 
Study, for example, called workers' compensation "notably unsuccessful in delivering 
compensation" to occupational disease victims. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: VOLUME I: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 1 1 1  ( 1991)  
[hereinafter A.L.I., FRAMEWORK] . 
220. See Bartecchi et al., supra note 213, at 907 ("[I]t has been well documented that cigarette smoking 
substantially increases the risk of cardiovascular disease, including stroke, sudden death, heart 
attack, peripheral vascular disease, and aortic aneurysm."). 
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individual, bars all claims.221 While epidemiological evidence shows a clear 
causal connection between smoking and, say, lung cancer, little is known 
about how smoking causes lung cancer. The state of science is such that a 
claimant simply cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence that in her 
particular case, her disease was the result of smoking. A weak 
preponderance rule, one that allows statistical proof of causation provided 
the risk at issue accounts for greater than 50 % of the risk, has the same 
result in many cases, since the toxic risk rarely exceeds the background 
risk. 222 
This "all-or-nothing" approach has some significant drawbacks, 
particularly in contexts where causation can be demonstrated only 
probabilistically. Suppose, for example, that science demonstrates quite 
clearly that smoking nearly doubles a person's risk of heart disease (a 
probability factor of just under 50%). Smokers with heart disease would be 
unable, absent some additional evidence, to collect in a Smokers' 
Compensation system that adopted a "preponderance of the evidence" causal 
requirement. Alternatively, if science demonstrated that smoking just barely 
doubles a person's risks of heart disease (a probability factor of just over 
50%), then manufacturers would be liable in circumstances when their 
products were not responsible (or at least not fully responsible) for the 
claimant's harm. Consequently, a "preponderance of the evidence" 
approach risks underdeterring or overdeterring cigarette manufacturers and 
their consumers. 
c. Probabilistic Causation and Proportional Liability 
The problems with those two causal standards help to highlight the 
potential benefits of a "probabilistic causation" approach. This approach 
allows claimants to use epidemiological and statistical evidence to establish 
probable specific causation, and then discounts damages accordingly. If we 
suppose again that smoking nearly doubles the risk of heart disease (assume 
a probability factor of 45 % ) , under probabilistic causation a claimant with 
heart disease would collect 45 % of the costs she has incurred. In 55 % of the 
cases, smokers' heart disease would not be caused by smoking, but all 
smokers could win discounted damages for their heart disease. In the 
aggregate, then, the industry would thus pay the full cost of the injuries it is 
22 1 .  Rosenberg, supra note 36, at 858. 
222. Id. 
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causing, albeit not to the exact victims since they cannot be accurately 
identified. 223 
Proposals for probabilistic causation have grown out of toxic tort cases 
that pose many of the same proof-of-causation dilemmas that smoking does. 
Both types of cases face what the American Law Institute Reporters' Study 
terms "individual attribution uncertainty. "  This problem arises when trying 
to use aggregate statistics to show specific causation. 224 Epidemiology might 
show statistics that, among smokers with lung cancer, 95 % of the lung 
cancer cases are caused by smoking (i.e . , general causation), but a smoker 
with lung cancer may not be able to prove that he is in that 95 % (i.e . ,  
specific causation) . Unlike traditional notions of causation, the probabilistic 
notion does not depend on physiological evidence of causation in the victim. 
Troyen Brennan and Robert Carter argue that such a change in concepts of 
causation mirrors changes in scientific thought. Science no longer looks for 
absolute, deductive explanations of occurrences, but allows for 
probabilities .225 Brennan and Carter acknowledge the difficulty of 
establishing a statistically precise probability factor, but believe that with 
epidemiological studies and expert testimony, fact-finders could generally 
"arrive at some good estimate of the probability of causation in the individual 
case . "226 Epidemiologists whom we have spoken with about the specific 
topic of smoking-caused illness agree. 
This notion of causation based on probability is particularly apt in cancer 
cases.227 Scientists do not know precisely how carcinogenesis occurs, a fact 
that makes proof of causation in any individual case difficult. Indeed, it is 
on that basis that cigarette manufacturers have long maintained that there is 
no "proof" that smoking causes cancer .  Yet there is ample statistical and 
epidemiological evidence for scientists to infer with confidence that smoking 
causes some types of cancer. Basing causation on statistical probability 
accounts for the known correlation in the aggregate despite the inability to 
prove causation in the individual .  
For these reasons, probabilistic recovery may be appropriate for 
smoking-related harms, harms that involve the same sort of clear but difficult 
223. For a leading work on notions of proportional liability, see id. 
224. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: VOLUME II: 
APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 326-27 ( 199 1 )  [hereinafter A.L.I., 
APPROACHES]. 
225. Troyen A. Brennan & Robert F. Carter, legal and Scientific Probability of Causation of Cancer and 
Other Environmental Disease in Individuals, I 0 J. OF HEALTH POL., PoL'Y & L. 33, 39 (1985). 
226. Id. at 58. This task might be undertaken by an advisory science panel. See infra notes 272-84 and 
accompanying text. 
227. See Brennan & Carter, supra note 225, at 58. 
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to prove causal link that is found in other settings in which probabilistic 
recovery is most frequently recommended. For example, the American Law 
Institute Reporters' Study endorsed Professor Rosenberg 's recommendation 
of proportional liability in environmental .tort cases. 228 Brennan and Carter 
also recommend applying proportional liability to cases in which an 
increased risk is attributed to an "environmental agent. "229 Some states have 
begun to tum theory into practice in their workers' compensation programs. 
For one specific example, Arksansas currently allows for probabilistic 
recovery in occupational disease cases. If an occupational disease is 
aggravated by another noncompensable disease, or if work plays a role in 
aggravating another disease, compensation may be reduced accordingly. 230 
While probabilistic recovery may be the most accurate means of 
establishing specific causation on a system-wide (rathei: than individual) 
level, such accuracy carries with it administrative costs . Successfully 
implementing probabilistic recovery would require experts to establish the 
probability factors of smoking with respect to various harms in a variety of 
situations. If these determinations are to be as accurate as possible, they 
wouid be made on a case-by-case basis; after all , accurate probabilities will 
depend on the other potential causes of the harm to which the claimant may 
have been subject. Such inquiries would be expensive, however, both in 
terms of fact-finders' time and to the parties , who would almost certainly 
need to hire attorneys, conduct discovery, and adopt other trappings of 
litigation. 
The administrative costs of case-by-case probability determinations most 
likely outweigh the accuracy benefits, particularly as those costs fall heavily 
on the parties . The goal, then, in designing the system is to determine what 
level of accuracy yields the benefits equal to its costs. A science panel might 
establish probability charts depending on demographic variables, quantity 
and brand smoked, family histories, employment conditions, and so on. The 
degree of detail will be contingent upon the optimization calculus and 
political realities. 231 
228. A.LI., APPROACHES, supra note 224, at 37 1 .  
229. Brennan & Carter, supra note 225, at 59. 
230. Ark. Code Ann. § l 1-9-601 (c)( 1 )  (1 987). 
23 1 .  It is worth reiterating that the theoretical optimization point is arguably oflittle utility in identifying 
the appropriate level of detail. Although on a macro level, the complexity of the probabil ity 
determinations should be increased until the marginal accuracy benefit equals the marginal cost, 
political considerations are unlikely to operate on that principle. The costs of administering the 
Smokers' Compensation system will fall either on the government or the industry, in all like) ihood. 
If on the government, the policymakers may be expected to put a premium on keeping costs down, 
even if the result is that the system is less likely to compensate the right victims the correct amount. 
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d. Evidentiary Presumptions 
While probabilistic causation has been recommended for cases similar 
to those posed by cigarettes, it has not been widely implemented. A more 
common feature of proposed causation-based compensation systems is the 
use of evidentiary presumptions. 
Garner, Ausness, and Lebel all propose presumptions of causation for 
certain diseases depending on the claimant's smoking history.232 Rabin 
discusses two proposed systems for mass toxic tort cases that would create 
rebuttable presumptions of causation when the alleged source of the harm 
was in the hazardous waste business (generation, transport, or disposal) at 
the time of exposure, the claimant was exposed, and the injury was of the 
kind known to result from such exposure.233 There is also precedent for 
presumptions of causation in federal law, as they are key features of both the 
Black Lung Benefits Program and the National Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program. 234 
Presumptions could play a role in Smokers' Compensation by reducing 
the obstacle facing claimants of proving a causal connection that is often 
difficult or costly to establish. Presumptions could also be used to expedite 
the claims process by avoiding the necessity of proving repeatedly that, for 
example, smoking causes lung cancer. Smokers ' Compensation might 
include presumptions that smoking over a certain number of years causes 
certain diseases . Depending on the system, such prescriptions could be 
rebuttable or irrebuttable. Failure to satisfy the conditions of the 
presumption might, depending on the system, bar compensable claims from 
being brought, or it might simply shift the burden of proving causation to the 
claimant. 
If the industry funds the system, the policymakers would have an incentive to maximize accuracy 
determinations beyond the optimization point since the cigarette manufacturers would be footing 
the bill. 
232. See supra notes 1 34--46 and accompanying text. 
233. Rabin, supra note 53, at 96 1 .  
234. The law establishing the Black Lung Benefits Program created two rebuttable presumptions for 
miners with at least ten years' experience in the mines: I) that pneumoconiosis (black lung disease) 
is work-related; and 2) that death due to respiratory disease is caused by pneumoconiosis. There 
were also two irrebuttable presumptions concerning miners with complicated pneumoconiosis: I )  
that the miner i s  totally disabled; and 2) that death was due to the disease. Federal Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, § 4 1 l (c); 83 Stat. 742, 793 (1969). Subsequent 
amendments created new presumptions and eliminated others. The National Vaccine program relies 
on a "nearly irrefutable presumption of liability" for certain diseases contracted within a given 
period of time from vaccination. Rabin, supra note 53, at 959. 
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3. The Cigarette Card: Either Credit Card or Stored Value Technology 
Another method of gathering information regarding a person's smoking 
history-for purposes of determining both general causation and claim-specific 
causation-would involve an idea that we first introduced in the Yale article; 
namely, the "cigarette card. "235 The idea would be to require individuals 
who wish to smoke first to purchase a cigarette card. This card would then 
have to be presented to the cigarette retailer, at the time of purchase, 
whenever a pack of cigarettes is purchased. As described in that article, the 
card could be designed along the lines of a credit card or A TM card so that 
every time a cigarette purchase occurred information regarding the brand of 
cigarette being purchased, the date of purchase, the number of packs, 
perhaps the age of the purchaser, among other things, would be recorded. 
Then, if a smoker were later to bring a Smokers' Compensation claim 
against cigarette manufacturers, the smoker's cigarette-card information 
could be used to help resolve the difficult causal issues discussed in the 
preceding two subsections. This information could also be used to determine 
how to allocate the damages among cigarette manufacturers (in cases in 
which the smoker has smoked multiple brands) so as to maximize the brand­
specific deterrence effect of the Smokers' Compensation regime. 236 
Notwithstanding the deterrence benefits of the cigarette card idea 
(discussed in greater detail in the earlier article), this version of the cigarette 
card idea-the credit-card version-is subject to two principal criticisms, the 
first having to do with administrative costs and the second having to do with 
privacy concerns. The administrative costs of such a system would 
obviously be substantial. Every store that sold cigarettes would be required 
to have a machine that could read the cigarette card, and that machine would 
have to be connected to the cigarette-card network, which presumably would 
be done over a telephone line. Those machines would cost money, and 
maintaining the network would cost money . The privac.y concern seems to 
be the most troubling aspect of the cigarette-card idea for most people (based 
on the feedback we have received from the Yale article). Many are 
extremely troubled by the notion that detailed information regarding 
everyone's smoking habits would be kept in some central data-bank. 
In the Yale article, we offer some responses to these administrative-cost 
and privacy concerns,237 and we will not rehearse those responses here. 
235. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1291-95. 
236. See infra Part IV.E. 
237. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1292, 1295. 
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Rather, we will suggest an alternative version of the cigarette card that might 
entail lower administrative costs than the credit-card version and that would 
virtually eliminate the privacy concerns. Instead of using credit-card 
technology, which stores information in a central data-bank, we might adopt 
the so-called stored value technology, which stores information instead on 
a magnetic strip or tiny computer chip embedded in the card itself. 
The potential administrative-cost savings would come from not having 
to maintain a network connecting all of the cigarette-card machines or a 
centralized databank. Each cigarette retailer need only have a machine that 
can read the data on the card. And the privacy benefits would be enormous. 
All of the information that would be so valuable for purposes of determining 
causation (and, as we will see in the next section, for allocating payments 
among companies )-number of packs and brand purchased, dates of purchase, 
age at time of purchase, etc .-could all be kept on one's own cigarette card. 
And that information would be seen by no one but the smoker, unless and 
until the smoker decided to bring a Smokers' Compensation claim, at which 
point the card would be presented and mined for data that would be relevant 
to the causal determinations not only in that particular case but in other cases 
as well .238 It is our understanding that the technology already exists for 
creating stored-value cigarette cards along the lines we have described.239 
One major drawback of the type of stored-value card just described is 
that, if the card is lost, all of the valuable data regarding the individual 's 
smoking history would be lost as well.240 There are a number of potential 
responses to that problem that the Smokers' Compensation regime might 
adopt, if it were to use a stored-value cigarette card. First, we could do 
nothing; that is, we could just count on smokers to keep up with their cards, 
and if they lose their cards require them to go through all of the standard 
methods of establishing causation that were discussed in the preceding two 
238. And although one might complain about the loss of privacy at that point, such a complaint would 
not be specific to a Smokers' Compensation regime, but rather would apply to any compensation 
regime that requires the smoker to make a factual showing regarding her smoking history. 
239. For a thorough discussion of the stored-value card (the technology behind it, its growing use as a 
system of payment that may eventually rival the credit card and the check, and its overall 
advantages and disadvantages), see generally RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER 
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS (forthcoming Aspen 1999) (copy of manuscript on file with authors). 
240. What we have thus far been discussing is a version of an "unaccountable" stored-value card. With 
such a card, the data exists only on the card. If the card is lost or stolen, the data is lost. An 
alternative is the "accountable" stored-value card, which stores the information not only on the card 
itself but also at some centralized backup location so that if the card is lost or stolen, the operator 
of the system can reconstruct the lost data from the centralized data bank. Id. See MANN supra note 
241 (manuscript Assignment 15, at 2-3). Most of the stored-value cards currently in use are of the 
unaccountable variety. Id. 
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sections . Second, we could try to develop methods by which smokers could 
back up the data from their cards onto their home computers or in some 
other way. This approach would add to administrative costs , and it may be 
impractical to expect smokers to be so conscientious as to regularly back up 
their cigarette cards . Third, we could develop a system that would back up 
the cigarette-card data at the point of purchase and store the information, not 
only on the card itself, but also in some centralized location. 241 Although this 
approach would seem to reintroduce all of the administrative-cost and 
privacy concerns that the stored-valued card was intended to eliminate, that 
need not necessarily be so. It might be possible to design a backup system, 
where individuals' cigarette data could be stored centrally, but that would 
allow access to that data only by the smoker herself in cases in which her 
card is lost or stolen. In other words, although the data would be gathered 
and stored by some third party (perhaps the federal government or perhaps 
some private company would administer the system), by law the only parties 
who would be allowed to gain access to the information would be the smoker 
herself or someone authorized by her to retrieve the information.242 This 
would not eliminate the privacy concern. The information would still be out 
there . But it would lessen the concern. 
In any event, we do not pretend to know the optimal tradeoff among the 
privacy concerns, the administrative-cost · concerns, and the deterrence 
concerns in connection with the cigarette card. We mean here only to make 
clear that the tradeoff exists . 
E. How Are Payments Allocated Among Companies? 
If, as is true of the vast majority of smokers, a claimant smoked only one 
brand of cigarette or several brands of cigarettes produced by the same 
manufacturer, 243 then establishing claimant-specific causation would be 
sufficient. When the smoking-related injuries must be divided among 
multiple brands produced by multiple manufacturers, however, a Smokers ' 
Compensation system needs to allocate liability across different brands. As 
we have seen, Ausness and Lebel do not address this question; under their 
proposals, damages across manufacturers would be financed by excise taxes 
24 1 .  This would be a version of the accountable stored-value card, discussed supra note 240. 
242. There is some evidence that the technology exists to develop this sort of backup system as well, 
although such systems are not currently in wide use where stored-value cards are being used. 
MANN, supra note 239 (manuscript Assignment 1 5, at 2-3). 
243. See supra note 46. 
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such that liability would, in effect, be determined by market share . 244 The 
Black Lung and National Vaccine programs are similarly funded by taxes,245 
with liability allocated according to market share rather than causal share. 
1. Division of Liability 
In this subsection, we identify five possible methods of allocating liability 
among cigarette manufacturers other than market-share liability . We begin 
with the least accurate and probably least administratively expensive and 
move toward the most accurate and most expensive. We do not speculate 
here as to whether the trade-off in terms of greater accuracy justifies the 
added administrative costs . Our goal is simply to highlight a few of the 
possible options. 
First, responsibiiity could be divided equally among the manufacturers 
that produced cigarettes smoked by the claimant. This method would be the 
easiest to administer, as it would require only information regarding which 
brands were smoked and some basic arithmetic. Such an approach is at least 
one step better than an allocation based solely on market-share, because 
under an equal allocation approach only those companies that manufactured 
the particular smoker's cigarettes would pay for that smoker's harms. If 
many consumers are reasonably brand loyal or if those who are not brand 
loyal switch brands randomly (at random time intervals),246 then 
manufacturers of relatively safe cigarettes should thrive, and competition for 
safety should emerge. Nevertheless, the nexus between causation and 
payment of damages might be fairly attenuated, reducing the beneficial 
incentive effects of the system. 
Second, rather than dividing liability equally, a Smokers' Compensation 
System could pro-rate liability according to the length of time a smoker 
consumed each manufacturer's product. This method would require the 
factfinder to establish additional information, and thus would add to the 
administrative costs of the process. Presumably, however, pro-rated liability 
could represent an improvement over the equal allocation method proposed 
immediately above, inasmuch as it would allocate damages in a way that 
244. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
245. 26 U.S.C. § 9501 (1 994) (Black Lung); 26 U.S.C. § 95 1 0  (1 994) (National Vaccine). 
246. If brand switching were independent of the risks posed by the different brands, then makers of more 
dangerous cigarettes would bear more liability. To be sure, in some cases, those manufacturers will 
be charged only halfofthe damages (assuming only two brands smoked) when they caused more 
than half. However, they will more often be charged half than the other brands because, by 
hypothesis, their cigarettes are more dangerous. 
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more closely approximated the harm done by the respective manufacturers . 
This approach, too, may have problems. For example, insofar as smokers 
systematically smoke disproportionately dangerous cigarettes for 
disproportionately short durations, this equal allocation-by-time method will 
not yield an ideal deterrence signal. To help address any such problem, this 
allocation system could adopt a rebuttable presumption that all cigarettes are 
equally dangerous.247 Manufacturers of demonstrably safer cigarettes would 
be permitted to rebut that presumption and thereby reduce their shares of 
liability . 248 
Estimating the number of cigarettes smoked of each brand would further 
refine the allocation process. It may be that a smoker begins smoking a half­
a-pack-per-day of Brand X and does so for 10 years . If that person then 
moves on to Brand Y for another 10 years, while also increasing 
consumption to a pack per day, she has smoked twice as many Brand Y 
cigarettes, though the time frame for each brand was the same. Donald 
Garner has suggested the per-number means of allocating liability, coupled 
with a rebuttable presumption that cigarettes are equally dangerous.249 
Underlying both the time-and number-allocation approaches is an assumption 
that it does not matter if a cigarette is the first or last smoked. 
For a variety of reasons, it may be desirable to allocate on other than a 
pro-rata basis. One possibility is a "winner-take-all" system, by which the 
manufacturer who produced the most cigarettes smoked by the claimant 
assumes all liability . This method would reduce administrative costs 
incurred as a result of disputes among manufacturers with regard to who 
should bear what portion of the liability. If we assume a random distribution 
of smoking patterns across brands, this method should balance out 
247. See Gamer, supra note 1 34, at 3 1 6-17. 
248. Although the administrative board may lack information to judge adequately the relative riskiness 
of cigarettes, manufacturers probably do not. By placing the burden on manufacturers, therefore, 
the presumption forces the well informed manufacturer to inform the poorly informed regulator. 
Furthermore, it does so in a way that pits manufacturers against manufacturers in contrast to the 
current regime in which manufacturers' regulatory incentives is basically to stick to one simple 
story-there is no proof that cigarettes of any type cause cancer and smoking cigarettes is not 
addictive. A code of silence in response to such a presumption, however, is certainly not 
unimaginable given the industry's history, and would partially undermine the primary motivation 
of ex post incentive-based regulation by sharply reducing care-level considerations from 
manufacturing decisions. While this behavior would not be in individual companies' best interests, 
oligopolistic decision-making might prompt such action, particularly if the industry felt that the 
Smokers' Compensation system could be dismantled if it failed to produce results. But even were 
it the case that manufacturers could not manage to cooperate in that way, it is not clear that 
administrative regulators could be sufficiently competent to sort out any informational disputes and 
competing claims among manufacturers. 
249. Garner, supra note 1 34, at 3 1 6-1 7. 
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manufacturers' liability in the aggregate . If, however, certain brands are 
"starter" cigarettes, or for other reasons are smoked disproportionately for 
shorter periods of time, those brands would be underdeterred. Another 
option would be to give a larger share of the liability to the company 
producing the first brand smoked. This "addiction penalty" might be 
warranted for a number of reasons. For example, first-brands are arguably 
more costly in that they create the addiction. Assigning greater liability to the 
manufacturer of the first cigarette smoked may further deter tobacco 
companies from marketing to children and nonsmokers . They would 
presumably place a greater premium on converting existing smokers, for 
whom the liability risks are lower, than creating new smokers. Moreover, 
the toxins of the first brands may be more dangerous, other things being 
equal, inasmuch as those toxins linger in a smoker's body for more years 
than do those of later-smoked brands. That point suggests a third non-pro­
rata option, which is to weight liability according to estimated marginal 
damage. If the evidence shows .that smoking for five years is relatively 
harmless, and that the cigarettes smoked between years six and ten are more 
destructive, the system might put greater liability on those manufacturers of 
brands smoked between years six and ten. 
2. Danger Quotients 
To further encourage tobacco companies to develop safer cigarettes, pro­
rata liability allocations might be refined by establishing and regularly 
updating a danger quotient for each brand of cigarette. A science panel 
might, for instance, use data, including those created through the Smokers ' 
Compensation system, to run epidemiological regression analysis in order to 
identify which cigarettes were most dangerous, holding other variables 
constant. 250 With that information, each brand of cigarette would be assigned 
a quotient indicating its danger level. After allocating liability, for example 
according to number of cigarettes smoked or length of time each brand was 
smoked, the tribunal would adjust the allocation amounts based on the 
relative danger quotients of the relevant brands.251 To further refine the 
250. Cf Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1274, 1292 (suggesting ways in which an ex post incentive 
based system might create valuable information). 
25 1 .  For example, assume the manufacturers of Brands A and B are initially adjudged to be l iable for 
40% and 60% respectively of a claimant's damages, and that the danger quotients of their brands 
are 8 for A and 5 for B. The final percentages of damages owed by each would be the initial 
allocation weighted by the danger quotients, a ratio of 320:300 (40 x 8 for A; 60 x 5 for B), or 
5 1 .6% for A and 48.4% for B. Thus, while a claimant may have smoked more of Brand B, the 
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system, the science panel might establish various danger quotients for each 
brand with respect to different diseases. Speaking entirely hypothetically, 
it may be that while Marlboro is particularly prone to cause lung cancer, it 
is less likely to cause heart disease, and Camel is the opposite. Separate 
danger quotients would account for such variations. 
By using danger quotients, the system would further accommodate for 
the fact that cigarettes are not equally dangerous. All but the last of the 
allocation methods suggested above assume that cigarettes are 
interchangeable.252 Each method allocates liability pro-rata, whereas the 
reality may be that the cigarettes did not play an equal role in causing the 
injury. Two parties may each dump twenty barrels of waste at a site, but if 
one dumps benzene and the other old clothes, their contribution to the 
resulting pollution is hardly equal. The danger quotient adjustment makes 
the allocation of liability more accurate, by estimating the relative 
contribution of each brand to the smokers' injury not just quantitatively, by 
time or number of cigarettes ,  but qualitatively. Adopting this feature only 
makes sense, of course, if the benefit of the added accuracy warrants the 
probably significant costs of developing and maintaining the danger 
quotients. 253 
3. Establishing Brand-Specific Smoking History 
Any of these methods of allocating liability depends on first establishing 
which brands of cigarettes the claimant smoked. As discussed above, there 
is strong evidence that smokers are quite brand-loyal and even more 
manufacturer loyal.254 Thus, the smoking history inquiry is l ikely to be 
manufacturer of A would wind up paying slightly more than half of the damages because its 
cigarette was more dangerous than Brand B. 
252. To be clear, that does not mean that the other methods would not require manufacturers of relatively 
dangerous cigarettes to pay more compensation than that paid by manufacturers of relatively safe 
cigarettes, other things equal. See supra note 246. More dangerous cigarettes cause more injuries, 
resulting in higher payments by their manufacturers, even under a pro-rata allocation system. 
253. For reasons discussed below, the danger quotient idea should be used, if at all, only to allocate 
liability among manufacturers, not to set the level of damages. If the amount of damages were to 
tum in part on the brands smoked, the system would create an incentive to lie about one's smoking 
history. 
254. See supra note 48. It should be noted that there is some "wiggle" room with respect to liability 
allocation. As long as the correct manufacturers are identified, errors in allocation by brand are 
irrelevant. If, for example, a smoker smoked five different products, all manufactured by Philip 
Morris, then any allocation among brands would result in the same payment by Philip Morris, and 
Philip Morris would probably have a fairly accurate sense of relative dangerousness of each of its 
own brands. Cf generally David Rosenberg, Joint and Several Liability for Toxic Torts, I S  J. 
HAzARoous MATERIALS 219 ( 1987) (arguing that by confronting a manufacturer with the aggregate 
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manageable, as smokers tend to change brands infrequently. The obvious 
source of this information is the smoker. The claim procedure could require 
an affidavit by the smoker estimating the number of years and quantity 
smoked of each brand. over her smoking life. 
Although an affidavit by the smoker would be difficult to verify without 
new systems in place,255 the system could be designed such that smokers 
would have little incentive to lie. Indeed, it is worth noting that the question 
of brand-specificity has not played a prominent role in cigarette litigation to 
date.256 For several reasons, the issue would likely be even less significant 
under a Smokers' Compensation program. First, as we explained above, 
compensation would probably be limited to economic losses for which 
people commonly carry insurance. In such a scenario, many claims will be 
brought by insurance companies in subrogation. Since the smoker would not 
be collecting the damages, the smoker would have no reason to lie about the 
brands he smoked. More fundamentally, however, as long as the amount of 
liability does not turn on which brands were smoked, neither smoker nor 
insurer will have an interest in filing a claim against a particular 
manufacturer. The brands smoked would dictate only the source of the 
damage payments, not the amount. 257 In any event, insofar as the system did 
create an incentive to lie about what brand or brands a claimant smoked, 
substantial fines for intentional misrepresentation could further diminish the 
likelihood that a smoker would lie about his or her smoking history. 258 
relative risk, the manufacturer would take optimal precautions and charge the right price with 
respect to each of its brands). As the number of manufacturers involved in a given claim increased, 
it would become more important to make accurate brand-or manufacturer-specific causal 
determinations. Moreover, even if a smoker smoked only one manufacturer's brands, the 
manufacturer may itself benefit if a reasonably accurate brand-specific causal link can be 
established. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1274. 
255. One such verification system is the cigarette card. See supra notes 235-42 and accompanying text. 
256. Interview with Daynard and Wilner, supra note 2 1 1 .  
25 7. This proposition does not mean that all cigarettes must be treated equally. Adoption of the damage 
quotient proposal would not create an incentive to lie about which brands a claimant smoked'. In 
the proposal above, the danger quotients would be used to alter the allocation of liability among 
manufacturers, not to fix the amount ofliabil ity. 
258. Another way oflooking at this question is through the lens of the accuracy-administrability trade­
off. The accuracy of the liability calculations, and consequently the deterrence function of the 
system, might be enhanced by factoring the smokers' brands into the calculus. For example, 
epidemiological evidence might suggest that certain brands are more likely to cause heart disease, 
but less likely to cause lung cancer. Others might pose a relatively significant risk of emphysema 
but be relatively safe with respect to heart disease. Such evidence could affect outcomes, 
particularly in a probabilistic causation system. If brands were taken into consideration, the 
probability factors would change, resulting in more or less of a discount in damage awards. In that 
case, then, the savvy lung cancer claimant might claim that she or he smoked a cigarette more likely 
to cause lung cancer. Such an increase in accuracy would therefore require additional administrative 
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V.  OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL ISSUES 
A. Transition Issues 
If lawmakers decide to adopt some form of Smokers' Compensation, 
they still must determine how best to make the transition from the current 
system to a Smokers' Compensation system. This transition presents two 
general questions: First, to what extent should Smokers' Compensation 
claimants be allowed to recover for losses caused by smoking that occurred 
before the adoption of the new program?259 Second, given the relatively long 
latency periods of most smoking-related illnesses, when will claimants be 
allowed to bring claims for losses resulting from post-enactment smoking? 
Although a complete answer to those questions is beyond the scope of this 
article, in this section we suggest the types of issues that would need to be 
addressed. Throughout this analysis, again, the goal is to provide the 
optimal degree of deterrence within the constraints of political and 
administrative feasibility . 
One approach would be to make the Smokers'  Compensation program 
purely prospective, in the sense that claims could be brought only for harm 
resulting from post-enactment smoking. The rationale for such an approach 
might be that, since our principal goal is deterrence, and since past smoking­
caused harms are, in effect, sunk costs, the only relevant costs from a 
deterrence perspective are those associated with future smoking. Under such 
an approach, smokers who brought claims immediately following the 
enactment of the program would recover nothing, given that the smoker's 
cancer, lung disease, or heart disease-even if attributable to cigarettes-would 
not have been attributable to post-enactment smoking. Under a purely 
prospective transition rule, therefore, smokers would not be able to bring 
claims for several years after enactment of the program. The precise length 
of the delay would depend upon the state of medical science regarding how 
long it takes for a person's smoking habit to produce one of the covered 
diseases . 
costs to verify the claimant's smoking history, or risk skewing the results. In this situation, the cost 
of verifying smoking history, such as requiring the production of receipts, would likely outweigh 
the benefit of additional accuracy. 
259. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1 30 1 .  
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· To illustrate this purely prospective approach, consider the following 
stylized example. Assume that, five years after the Smokers' Compensation 
program is enacted, a smoker brings a claim; and assume that this person has 
been smoking for 20 years-5 years post-enactment and 15-years pre­
enactment. If she meets all of the proof requirements, she would recover for 
the portion of her costs attributable to the five years of post-enactment 
smoking. To minimize administrative costs , we could assume that the last 
five years of smoking contributed as much to the smoker's health condition 
as the first fifteen years, in which case the smoker in this example would be 
allowed to recover for 25 percent of her economic losses . Alternatively, if 
we determined that the early years of smoking contributed the most to the 
smoker's  condition, the percentage for recovery in this case would be 
something less than 25 percent of her losses . In any event, under a purely 
prospective transition rule, the percentage of losses recoverable under 
Smokers' Compensation would increase each year following the enactment 
of the program. And after, say, 20 years have passed following the 
enactment of the regime (or whatever period of time is determined by the 
standing science panel), the system would be fully phased in; and claimants' 
damage awards would no longer be discounted. 
Notwithstanding its initial theoretical plausibility from a deterrence 
perspective, we almost certainly would not, and should not, adopt a purely 
prospective transition approach to a new Smokers' Compensation regime, for 
several reasons . First, again from a deterrence perspective, to apply the 
system purely prospectively would send a dangerous message to other 
industries whose products may pose similar risks but who have not yet been 
held liable.260 Moreover, allowing smokers to recover for at least a fraction 
of their pre-enactment smoking would increase the incentive for smokers to 
bring claims, which may be especially important in the early years of the 
program when post-enactment benefits would be relatively small. In 
addition, to the extent the system is also intended to serve a compensation 
function, retroactive claims are desirable. Allowing cigarette smokers to 
recover for at least some of their pre-enactment smoking-related costs would 
provide a form of first-party health and life insurance coverage, which will 
be especially beneficial to those who are uninsured or underinsured for such 
losses. 
Deterrence and compensation concerns, therefore, suggest that some 
recovery for the cost of pre-enactment smoking would be appropriate . In a 
purely theoretical world, in fact, optimal deterrence might require that the 
260. Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1 302-03. 
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Smokers' Compensation regime be fully retroactive, even to the point of 
bankrupting the industry. 261 In our view, however, the current political 
climate (and perhaps concerns of administrative costs) foreclose the 
option of full retroactivity. So how much retroactivity would be enough 
to generate some of the benefits mentioned above, but not so much as 
to bankrupt the industry? That will depend on a determination of how 
large a financial hit the industry can take without bankrupting many of 
the existing manufacturers. And the answer to that question will depend, 
in turn, on how much the existing companies will be able to raise their 
prices to cover claims for pre-enactment smoking without being driven 
out of the market by new start-up companies, who will be required to 
pay only claims for post-enactment smoking. 
We do not presume to know what that number will be, and we 
leave its ultimate determination to the expert panel that would be 
assigned the job of the working out the details of the system. However, 
for the purpose of illustration, let's assume that all of the 
objectives-optimal deterrence within cost and political 
constraints-would be achieved if, say, one-half of all economic costs 
from pre-enactment smoking were recoverable from manufacturers, 
along with all of the economic costs of post-enactment smoking. Recall 
the example of our 20-year smoker who brings a Smokers' 
Compensation claim five years after the regime is adopted. In that 
situation, the claimant would be allowed to recover five-eighths (or 
62.5%) of her total economic 1.osses. That includes the one quarter of 
her economic losses attributable to post-enactment smoking plus one 
half of the three quarters of her total economic losses that are 
attributable to pre-enactment smoking. Again, we have chosen these 
fractions to illustrate one approach to dealing with the transition to a 
Smokers' Compensation regime, but other fractions could be chosen, 
depending upon how the concerns of accuracy, complexity, and political 
feasibility are balanced. 
B. Preemption of State Tort Law 
A central question facing any tobacco regulation is the degree to which 
it will preempt state tort law options currently available to victims of 
smoking injuries. The Proposed Resolution would, in effect, go much of the 
26 1 .  Id. at 1304-07. 
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way towards preempting tort law in favor of command-and-control and 
performance-based regulation. Under the terms agreed to by the industry 
and states ' attorneys general , only individual trials would be available to 
injured parties .262 The Proposed Resolution precludes class actions and other 
consolidations, suits by any governmental entity, and punitive damages for 
past conduct. 263 The immunity that the tobacco industry seeks is not itself 
unprecedented, but the prospect of immunity from tort law without some new 
form of ex post incentive-based regulation may be. Tort claims for most 
workplace injuries, injuries resulting from work in coal mines, and injuries 
caused by vaccines are all preempted to varying degrees, but replaced with 
new ex post compensation regimes.264 Another common example of 
regulation preempting tort law is no-fault auto insurance. The preemption 
of tort law is not unprecedented, but it ought to be preempted in favor of an 
alternative that better meets the deterrence and compensation functions that 
tort law traditionally performs. 
One possibility is that Smokers' Compensation would not really 
preempt tort law at all . Like the Childhood Vacciilation Compensation 
Program and the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, Smokers' Compensation 
could represent an encouraged alternative, but not a bar to tort law.265 Filing 
a Smokers' Compensation claim might be a prerequisite to bringing a tort 
action, with claimants having the option of accepting or rejecting the 
Smokers' Compensation result. A variation on the co-existence model is to 
allow injured smokers the choice between bringing a tort claim, a Smokers' 
Compensation claim, but not both. Unlike the first possibility, here the 
claimants would not know what the Smokers' Compensation result would be 
before making this decision. Allowing dual systems accommodates concerns 
about industry capture of the Smokers' Compensation system. If smokers 
believed that the Smokers' Compensation system was shortchanging their 
claims, they would have redress in the courts .266 The maintenance of a tort 
option with other alternative systems has also sometimes been justified to 
accommodate the rare claims that exceeded the compensatory caps of the 
262. "Proposed Resolution," supra note 4, at 39. 
263. Id. 
264. See supra notes 5 1-133 and accompanying text. 
265. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text (CVCP) and supra notes 1 16-133 and accompanying 
text (DSCT). 
266. Cf David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons From a Special 
Master, 69 B.U. L. REv. 695, 705 ( 1 989) (arguing that "the opt-out procedure [in class actions] 
provides a check on whether the efficiencies of the collective process can be and have been 
translated into adequate compensation for victims"). 
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administrative system.267 Given a system that proposes to compensate all 
economic losses and would deliberately exclude other losses, this rationale 
is inapposite. In any event, due to the political constraints discussed above, 
this option is not viable. This system would give injured smokers the upside 
of a causation-based compensation system without limiting the tort options 
available to them. 
A more viable possibility is to focus the claims to which Smokers' 
Compensation will be open, leaving other alleged injuries to be adjudicated 
in tort law. The width or narrowness of that focus turns in large part on the 
questions of accuracy and cost with which we are now familiar. If an 
objective is minimizing the cost of the system, one would try to structure 
Smokers' Compensation to resemble a world in which all diseases are 
signature diseases . Thus, only claimants suffering from diseases such as 
lung and esophageal cancer and emphysema might bring claims. Others, 
such as those suffering from heart disease and other diseases of less certain 
causation, might be left to pursue their claims through the tort system. 
Under such a plan, the science panel might be authorized to certify new 
diseases for Smokers' Compensation as new epidemiological evidence 
emerges. Alternatively, the system might require that all injury claims be 
brought in the Smokers' Compensation system unless intentional or reckless 
misconduct is alleged. Workers' compensation systems often bar tort claims 
for workplace injuries with such an exception. 268 
One particular advantage to allowing some role for tort law, even if 
limited to cases of intentional and reckless harms, is to preserve its 
information-forcing function.269 As the recent attorneys'  general actions, 
particularly the recently settled case in Minnesota, have shown, litigation can 
play a significant role in bringing to light information of great importance to 
the pu�lic generally · and smokers in particular.270 Without tort law's 
extensive discovery, Smokers' Compensation is not set up to delve as deeply 
into questions of conduct. While a fully functioning. Smokers' Compensation 
system would theoretically provide information about cigarette safety through 
the pricing mechanism, a tort option for the most egregious instances of 
267. See Rabin, supra note 53, at 974 (discussing no-fault automobile insurance). 
268. See supra note 54. 
269. See Rabin, infra note 271,  at 1 1 . 
270. See, e.g. Barry Meier, Cigarette Maker Manipulated Nicotine, Its Records Suggest, N. Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 23, 1 998, at A l .  
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industry deception could provide an important further check on 
manufacturers. 271 
One final option, the one undoubtedly preferred by cigarette 
manufacturers, is to fully preempt all tort claims arising from smoking­
related injuries. Although workers' compensation usually allows claims of 
intentional torts to be pursued in tort as noted above, in most cases absolute 
preemption by Smokers' Compensation would mirror the familiar tradeoff 
of workers' compensation. A bar on tort claims could be characterized as 
the price smokers would pay for the more lenient causation-based alternative 
of Smokers' Compensation. This preemption option would, however, result 
in a broader, and hence more expensive Smokers' Compensation system. 
The best alternative, given the political constraints and the desire to optimize 
efficiency within those constraints, therefore might be one that channels most 
but not all claims to Smokers' Compensation, reserving some residual role 
for tort law. 
C. Expert Tobacco Disease Panel 
Regardless of the decision-making structure chosen, the complexity of 
the medical and scientific issues raised in tobacco-related injury cases makes 
a Tobacco Disease Panel ("TOP") of experts a potentially valuable adjunct 
of the Smokers' Compensation system. As the legal system has grappled 
with increasingly complicated questions of science, particularly with respect 
to causation, commentators have proposed various methods of incorporating 
facts and concepts that are beyond the expertise of most judges, to say 
nothing of juries.272 The American Law Institute Reporters' Study 
recommends science panels in mass tort cases when individual attribution 
uncertainty is a problem, as it is in tobacco cases.273 Judges too have begun 
increasingly to recognize the benefits of and to rely on experts in toxic tort 
27 1 .  See Robert L. Rabin, No-Fault Compensation for Tobacco-Related Disease, Remarks at the 
Conference on the So-Called Global Settlement 1 1, Univ. ofWisconsin Law School (Oct. 16, 1 997) 
(on file with authors) ("To me, this constitutes the strongest argument for keeping tort open, even 
if a no-fault plan were adopted-that is, to promote this informational function, or, more precisely: 
to make sure that the industry won't in the future engage in the kind of misconduct and deceit that 
it has in the past."). 
272. See Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding Alternative 
Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in Common Law Courts, 5 1  U. PIIT. L. 
REv. I ( 1989). 
273. A.L.I., APPROACHES, supra note 224, at 343. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (discussing 
individual attribution uncertainty). 
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cases.274 Still, while the Federal Rules of Evidence now allow courts to 
appoint expert witnesses,275 judges have rarely taken advantage of the 
opportunity. 276 There are several science panels working in regulatory 
contexts, however, that demonstrate the potential functions of the TDP.277 
The TDP's central role would likely be to develop policies for the 
Smokers' Compensation system with respect to the causal connection 
between smoking and specific diseases. This function could be modeled 
after Ontario's Industrial Disease Standards Panel, which assists that 
province's Workers' Compensation Board. The Ontario panel investigates 
potential occupational diseases, establishing a position on causation that 
determines eligibility for benefits and guides workers' compensation 
boards . 278 Similarly, the TOP would develop the presumptions and 
probability tables that the Smokers' Compensation board would use in 
weighing claims. As in Ontario, the administering body of the Smokers' 
Compensation system could refer particular questions to the TOP in 
situations in which the TOP has not yet determined causation. 279 The TOP 
might also appoint a neutral expert to testify in cases involving novel claims 
or claims which the TOP has not yet taken up.280 
Another role for the TOP is to establish the danger quotients for each 
brand of cigarettes , based in significant part on epidemiological data that 
emerges from the Smokers' Compensation program.281 This function 
274. See articles on breast-implant panel; see also Justice Breyer Calls/or Experts To Aid Courts in 
Complex Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1 7, 1998, at A l 7  (stating that even though "a judge is not a 
scientist and a courtroom is not a scientific laboratory" neutral experts "play an important role in 
educating judges on potentially relevant technical matters, helping to make us not experts but 
educated lay persons and thereby helping to improve the quality of our decisions"). 
275. FED. R. EVID. 706. 
276. Brennan, supra note 272, at 7. 
277. There is precedent for expert advisory panels within the federal government. Troyen Brennan cites 
the ATSDR and the Environmental Protection Agency's Scientific Advisory Panel as successful 
science panels. These bodies demonstrate, he asserts, the workability of such boards, that experts 
are available and willing to serve in such a role, and that the adversarial process is not essential to 
accurate factfinding. See Brennan, supra note 272, at 18 .  
278. Weiler, supra note 168, at 1 6. 
279. For example, the Ontario Industrial Disease Standards Panel conducted research into the link 
between gold mining and stomach and lung cancer at the request of the Workers' Compensation 
Board. The panel appointed a strictly scientific panel to examine the toxicological and 
epidemiological evidence and reach a consensus on the science, then the full panel factored in 
economic and policy considerations before making a finding concerning eligibility criteria. Id. at 
17. Unlike the model in Ontario, we may prefer to draw a clear line between the determination of 
causation and the policy recommendations concerning compensation. 
280. See Brennan, supra note 272, at 65 (proposing a Federal Toxic Substance Board that could provide 
lists of neutral experts whom courts might appoint in toxic tort cases). 
28 1 .  See supra notes 250-551  and accompanying text. 
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resembles the establishment of toxicological profiles of hazardous substances 
by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). Under 
the 1986 Superfund amendments, ATSDR is to interpret available 
toxicological and epidemiological information to "ascertain the levels of 
significant human exposure . . .  and the associated . . .  health effects. "282 
Like ATSDR's toxicological profiles, the TDP's danger quotients would 
"amountO to generic expert testimony by a neutral administrative science 
panel . "283 More generally, the TDP would monitor and sponsor research 
into the health effects of smoking and the individual ingredients in cigarettes. 
This function of the TDP might go beyond the ATSDR, and involve the TDP 
conducting and sponsoring its own research rather than pursuing a limited 
mandate. 
The TDP thus could play a significant role in Smokers' Compensation. 
If damages are scheduled, the TDP could add new diseases to the 
compensation schedule as science reveals new connections between smoking 
and disease.284 The panel could also establish the average treatment costs for 
covered diseases in order to set the schedule. Drawing on scientific and 
medical data, it could establish presumptions of causation with thresholds 
that reflect the correlation between smoking history and disease. The TDP 
could study the interaction of smoking with other factors to set guidelines or 
presumptions for allocating causation among potential causes of diseases . If 
the system incorporates notions of probabilistic causation, the TDP might 
develop a matrix of probability factors for certain diseases. Based on regular 
testing of all cigarette brands, it could establish danger quotients. In cases 
that raise novel or disputed medical or scientific theories, the TDP could 
appoint an expert to assist the factfinder. The panel would also continually 
monitor, and perhaps sponsor, research into the health effects of smoking, 
and periodically review and adjust as necessary the presumptions, probability 
factors, and other science-driven elements of the system. The objective of 
such a blue-ribbon board is to base decisions on the best available science 
and to establish consistency within the system. 
282. E. Donald Elliot, Planning and Managing Mass Toxic Tort Cases, C534 ALI-ABA 605, 626--27 
(1990) (quoting Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, § I 10(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9604(i)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1986)). 
283. Id. at 627. 
284. The silicone breast implants settlement creates a Medical Panel to fulfill such a function. Diseases 
may be added to the Disease Compensation Program by the five member court-appointed panel 
upon finding that the "then-existing medical and scientific evidence demonstrates that the disease 
or condition is caused by breast implants." In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 
No. C1v. A. CV94-P-1 1 558-S, 1994 WL 578353, at *8 (N.D. Ala. Sept. I, 1994). 
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D.  Financing the System 
Although the money to administer the Smokers' Compensation system 
might come from any number of sources, it should probably ultimately fall 
on cigarette manufacturers and smokers . It might be argued that the costs 
of administering a Smokers' Compensation program should be paid out of 
general tax revenues, particularly given that all taxpayers-smokers and 
nonsmokers alike-will benefit from the system at least to the extent' that 
public and private insurance mechanisms will be spared many of the costs of 
cigarette-related banns. The savings of as much as $40 billion per year that 
would accrue to those entities currently paying for tobacco-related diseases285 
might be expected in some measure to be passed on to consumers and 
taxpayers in the fonn of lower insurance premiums and taxes . In our view, 
however, the fact that nonsmokers have long had to share the costs of 
cigarettes does not justify requiring them to share in the costs of regulating 
cigarette market. That regulation of any sort is necessary in this context is 
aptly understood as a cost created by the cigarette market and one that should 
not be externalized to parties outside that market. 
Thus, we recommend the Smokers' Compensation system be funded as 
follows. The up-front start-up costs of setting up a Smokers' Compensation 
program should be paid for through a single lump sum charge against the 
industry, in proportion to each manufacturer's market share over the past 
several decades. Once the system is up and running, all subsequent costs of 
operation and administration should be charged to manufacturers in 
proportion to the harmfulness of their cigarettes . Supposing, for example, 
that the administrative costs of the Smokers' Compensation system was 
roughly 10% of the program's total pay-outs,286 then a 10% "hann-share 
tax" could be added to every dollar of compensation required of each 
manufacturer. Manufacturers of more dangerous cigarettes would, quite 
appropriately, be charged more in absolute tenns for the system than would 
manufacturers of relatively safe cigarettes. One important advantage of such 
a harm-share tax is that it would charge each manufacturer in accordance 
with the demands each makes on the system. A second significant advantage 
is that it would enhance the incentives created by the system to make safer 
cigarettes , without also giving rise to any sort of moral hazard problem on 
the part of claimants . 
285. See infra note 302. 
286. See supra note 74-75 and accompanying text summarizing evidence regarding the administrative 
costs of some existing no-fault compensation schemes). 
592 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 22 
E. Strategic Avoidance: The Judgment Proof Problem and Black Markets 
One potential objection to the workability of Smokers' Compensation 
is that the lag between the sale of cigarettes and the realization of the costs 
of those cigarettes presents an opportunity for manufacturers to evade those 
costs . For example, after profiting for twenty years or so, a cigarette 
company-finding itself on the verge of paying out a slew of maturing 
Smokers' Cqmpensation claims-might simply distribute its assets to its 
shareholders, rendering itself largely immune to the threat of Smokers' 
Compensation claims. Legal scholars sometimes describe this strategy as a 
form "judgment-proofing. "  To be sure, the judgment-proof manufacturer 
would then be bankrupted by the Smokers' Compensation claims, but only 
after many years of profiting substantially and distributing those profits to 
shareholders. Moreover, a company expecting to engage in such a strategy 
would be able to sell its cigarettes at a price substantially lower than the 
prices charged by companies that expect to be around to pay Smokers' 
Compensation claims. Thus, to avoid loss of market share and perhaps 
imminent bankruptcy, companies would have an incentive to cut prices 
similarly, taking the risk of long-run, strategic bankruptcy. 
There are several factors, however, that would tend to lessen the 
incentive toward judgment proofing. First of all, Smokers' Compensation 
claimants are not the only creditors of tobacco companies who have an 
interest in overcoming the judgment proof problem. In fact, one suspects 
that sophisticated long-term creditors of the tobacco companies would, as in 
other industries, find ways to protect themselves, protections that would (at 
least derivatively) protect Smokers' Compensation claimants as well. For 
example, those lenders might include loan covenants prohibiting (or, more 
generally, increasing the cost of) various judgment-proofing strategies-such 
as excessive dividends. 287 There are regulatory policies that could be 
287. It may be the case, however, that cigarette companies engage in very little long-term borrowing, but 
instead rely primarily on large amounts of short-term debt, such as commercial paper. If that is the 
case, the lenders would be relatively unconcerned about long-term judgment-proofing strategies, 
so long as insolvency was not expected to occur during a year in which the manufacturers have 
substantial loans outstanding. Thus, short-term lenders, like shareholders, would be beneficiaries 
(albeit perhaps unknowing beneficiaries) of the manufacturers' judgment-proofing strategy. One 
possible response to this problem would be to forbid short-term lending to cigarette companies. 
Thus, if the companies wanted to borrow, they would have to make a long-term commitment to their 
lenders not to engage in judgment-proofing strategies; and their lenders would have an incentive 
to monitor compliance with that commitment. Another analogous proposal, discussed in the text 
below, would be to require tobacco companies to purchase a certain amount ofliabil ity insurance, 
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adopted that would prevent manufacturers from evading the threat of future 
liability. For instance, as is provided for under the Proposed Resolution, 
manufacturers might be required to put up a substantial bond, to ensure that 
some assets are available in the future.288 Similarly, as is the case in for 
virtually all European corporations, manufacturers might be required to meet 
minimum capitalization requirements , which would serve the same purpose 
as a bond. In addition, cigarette manufacturers could be required to purchase 
a minimum amount of liability insurance which would cover the costs of 
future potential liability . 289 
It is also worth noting that opportunities for strategic avoidance of 
regulatory incentives exist for virtually all forms of regulation. For instance, 
manufacturers could avoid the effect of an excise tax by directly or indirectly 
selling their brands on black markets (as may be common in other countries 
that have substantial cigarette tariffs) .290 That evasion strategy would be less 
effective under a Smokers' Compensation system because manufacturers 
would have to pay for the harms caused by all of their cigarettes, even those 
purchased on black markets. 291 
F. Additional Bankruptcy Concerns 
One concern about Smokers' Compensation that we have heard is that 
imposing all (or substantially all) of the costs of smoking on the tobacco 
companies would bankrupt the industry. For a number of reasons, we 
regard the possibility of bankrupting several large manufacturers to be a 
politically non-viable alternative.292 Nevertheless, a Smokers' Compensation 
system as outlined in this Article could be designed specifically to 
accommodate any desired target cost without sacrificing its public health 
which would give insurers, rather than lenders, the incentive to monitor the manufacturers. 
288. Cf Proposed Resolution, supra note 4, at 28-29 (requiring new market entrants to put up such a 
bond). Cf Rosenberg, supra note 36, at 919-22 (describing an insurance-fund proposal intended 
to address these problems (and others) and under which claimants would bring their claims after a 
toxic exposure but, unlike Smokers' Compensation claimants, before an injury manifested itself). 
289. For example, if Philip Morris wanted to continue selling cigarettes, it would either need to post a 
bond or purchase a l iability insurance policy or perhaps somehow make available some of the assets 
held by the parent companies' non-tobacco subsidiaries. 
290. See AP, Cigarette Smuggling Probe Eyeing Employees al RJR, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 23, 1997, at 
AS; Raymond Bonner & Christopher Drew, Cigarette Makers Are Seen as Aiding Rise in 
Smuggling, N.Y. TIM�S, Aug. 25, 1997, at A l .  
291 .  Indeed, for that reason, manufacturers would have a strong incentive to discourage the emergence 
of black markets in their own cigarettes. 
292. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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aims. Indeed, the Smokers' Compensation system can be designed so as to 
impose no greater costs on the industry than the proposals currently on the 
table. 
If, as we have suggested, Smokers ' Compensation would cover only 
pecuniary losses293 and incorporated proportional liabilitf,94 the liability 
costs to manufacturers may not exceed the cost of current legislative 
proposals by as much as some might imagine.295 Some of the bills before 
Congress may cost the industry as much as $30 billion per year. 296 If 
Smokers' Compensation forced manufacturers to internalize the full current 
economic losses, the cost would likely substantially exceed that $30 billion 
figure .297 As described above, however, we foresee a transition period in 
which the manufacturers would not have to internalize all costs of pre­
enactment injuries .298 Furthermore, if, as we predict, the incentive effects 
293. See supra notes 170-87 and accompanying text. 
294. See supra notes 223-3 1 and accompanying text. 
295. We have not done a detailed economic analysis, but have done rough estimations simply to 
demonstrate that smokers' compensation need not be an unrealistically heavy cross for the 
manufacturers to bear. 
296. For example, Sen. McCain's latest Commerce Committee bill, which he is putting forward as a 
bipartisan proposal, could carry a price-tag of $600 to $700 bill ion over twenty-five years, or as 
much as $28 billion per year. See Jeffrey Taylor & Suein L. Hwang, Tobacco Plan ls Criticized by 
Industry, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1998, at A lO. A $1 .50 per pack tax increase, also proposed, would 
likely cost even more, since Sen. McCain's bill contemplates a price increase of $ 1 . 1 0  per pack. 
See Bob Hohler, Senators Put a Cap on Tobacco liability, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 3 1 ,  1 998, at A 1 .  
297. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in 1993 medical treatment for tobacco 
use cost $50 billion. Medical-Care Expenditures Attributable to Cigarette Smoking-United States, 
1993, 43 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY RPT. 469, 470 (July 8, 1994) (pub. by Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention) [hereinafter Centers for Disease Control]. Id. at 470-7 1 .  Another 
study found that in the early 1980s, direct health care costs resulting from smoking that would not 
otherwise have been incurred totaled $ 186 billion over five years. Thomas A. Hodgson, Cigarette 
Smoking and lifetime Medical Expenditures, 70 Milbank Quarterly 8 1 ,  I 09 ( 1992). Of that sum, 
54. 1 %  was paid by private insurers, 1 6% by Medicare, 1 1 .6% by Medicaid, and 18.3% by the 
smokers themselves. Id. After accounting for health care inflation and Hodgson's 3% discount rate, 
Hodgson's calculation of tobacco-caused expenditures is l ikely to approximate the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention's figure. Between 1987 and 1993 the health care costs attributable 
to smoking more than doubled. Centers for Disease Control, supra note 297, at 4 70. 
Although we have not found any studies of the lost wages attributable to smoking, a study of 
tobacco-attributed deaths found that in 1985, 45% of all such deaths in developed countries were 
of individuals younger than 65. Richard Peto et al., Mortality from tobacco in developed countries: 
indirect estimation from national vital statistics, 339 LANCET 1268, 1272 (May 23, 1 992). Robert 
Rabin corroborates this figure, stating that the average age at which victims contract lung cancer is 
65. Thus, he concludes, roughly half of those individuals are stricken before retirement age. Rabin, 
supra note 183, at 12. This number would suggest that fairly sizeable wage loss might be expected, 
although smokers disproportionately earn lower incomes. 
298. See supra notes 259-6 1 and accompanying text (describing transition options). 
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of Smokers' Compensation significantly change industry behavior, then 
smoking-related injuries should significantly decline. 
In any event, although we believe that a strong case can be made that 
cigarette manufacturers should bear the full health costs of their products, 
even if they do exceed the costs of current proposals, damages could be 
capped while maintaining many of the deterrence benefits of Smokers' 
Compensation. If policy makers determine that bankruptcy is a real concern, 
they could have tobacco companies pay out damages at a percentage of 
actual costs . The central goals of Smokers' Compensation-incorporating 
damage costs into cigarette prices and fostering a market for safety-rely 
more on accurate relative distribution of costs than accurate total cost 
shifting. The system could discount damages to any desirable level, and so 
long as the discount is across the board, the objectives of Smokers' 
Compensation will be met. 
G. The Question of Personal Responsibility 
Others might object to a Smokers' Compensation system (or to any 
other type of victim-initiated ex post incentive-based system) on the ground 
that it compensates smokers for the harms caused by cigarettes and thus 
removes from them any responsibility for their own decisions. The goal of 
a Smokers' Compensation system is to enhance public health. As Robert 
Rabin has noted, where no-fault compensation systems have been adopted, 
"a preoccupation with personal morality is alien. "299 For example, a worker 
who negligently contributes to his own injury is not barred from collecting 
workers' compensation.300 Nevertheless , if another goal of tobacco 
regulation were to force individuals to take responsibility for their actions, 
no policy response would be superior to a Smokers' Compensation system.301 
The concern about personal responsibility presumably derives from an 
impression that smokers may indulge themselves with impunity for decades, 
then they get to collect payments with relative ease when they get ill. This 
picture, however, fails to notice that smokers will have to pay for their right 
to make that claim. Smokers will be taking responsibility for their actions 
with each pack of cigarettes they purchase, in the form of higher cigarette 
299. Rabin, supra note 1 83, at 6. 
300. Id. 
30 1 .  For a fuller treatment of this argument and a related argument regarding the obl igation of the 
cigarette industry to take responsibility for its actions, see Hanson & Logue supra note 3, at 
1350-5 1 .  
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prices. The arrangement is no different from the arrangement that currently 
exists between insureds and their first-party insurers. Indeed, by forcing 
smokers to bear the costs their addiction causes, and by allowing public and 
private first-party insurers to bring quasi-subrogation claims again 
manufacturers, Smokers ' Compensation would result in lower insurance 
premiums for nonsmokers. As smokers would effectively buy separate 
insurance for most smoking-related injuries, private insurers and government 
programs such as Medicaid and Medicare would be relieved of an estimated 
$39.5 billion in smoking-related illnesses per year.302 By forcing smokers 
to pay the costs caused by their smoking, the system would be far stricter 
than the status quo, in which smokers pay a fraction of the actual cost of 
smoking and many are covered by insurance. It is the current system far 
more than Smokers' Compensation that allows smokers to disregard the 
substantial costs that their smoking poses to themselves and to others . 
There are several other characteristics of Smokers' Compensation and 
smoking injuries that mitigate any problem of personal responsibility. First, 
as noted above, we propose limiting recovery to economic damages. Insofar 
as individuals suffer substantial non-economic harms that are not 
compensated, they do not get something for nothing. Moreover, the harms 
caused by cigarettes are, of course, often quite serious . Even to the extent 
smokers or their families receive monetary compensation for some of the 
costs of cigarette-caused harms, it is difficult to say that the dead or 
seriously-ill smoker ever fully evades the ultimate responsibility for her 
smoking decisions . Finally, of course, smokers are not the only actors who 
should be accountable for their actions . Under an ex post incentive-based 
regime, tobacco manufacturers, too, would be forced to bear responsibility 
for their actions. 303 
302. See Centers for Disease Control, supra note 297, at 470-7 1 .  The estimated savings are almost 
certainly low, as the figure is based on 1993 data. In 1987, medical expenditures attributable to 
cigarettes came from the following sources: self pay (21 .0%), private insurance (33.4%), Medicare 
(20.4%), Medicaid ( 10.2%), other federal (9.5%), other state (3.2%), and other (2.2%). Id. 
According to the 1987 breakdown of source of payments, and the 1993 health care costs, assuming 
no health care inflation in the last five years, Medicare alone would stand to save more than $I 0 
billion per year. 
303. Recent reports suggest that the Proposed Resolution would have the perverse effect of increasing 
net profits of tobacco manufacturers. An ex post incentive-based regime would not have such an 
effect. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
As this article goes to press, a variety of Congressional committees are 
considering a slew of tobacco bills. While anybody concerned about public 
health would take heart in this new-found attention to the need to regulate the 
market for cigarettes, we are concerned that the current momentum will not 
be marshaled to significantly alter the behavior of the tobacco companies. 
For all of the Proposed Resolution's discussion of reforming the corporate 
culture of the cigarette manufacturers,304 the incentives of these companies 
would, as far as we can tell, remain basically unchanged. Under any of the 
proposals now on the table, cigarette manufacturers can be expected to 
continue resisting or attempting to evade the spirit of any regulation that 
would shrink their market or increase their costs . The Proposed Resolution 
and the spin-off bills in Congress would certainly change the regulatory 
framework in which tobacco companies operate, but they would not change 
the way those companies operate; their priorities would remain the same. 305 
We fear that without altering the cigarette manufacturers' basic 
incentive structure, attempted regulation will not result in the intended public 
health improvements but nevertheless will give the cigarette manufacturers 
a tremendous public relations boost and virtual immunity from future 
regulation for at least a generation. The tobacco industry has shown a knack 
for evading regulations and even turning regulations to its advantage. A 
recurrence of that phenomenon is not only the prediction of a sizable 
scholarly literature, 306 it is also the lesson of virtually every previous attempt 
to regulate the tobacco industry. 307 
Indeed, such efforts may already be underway. A recent Wall Street 
Journal article provides some disturbing information regarding emerging 
advertising practices of cigarette manufacturers in response to anticipated 
new restrictions. 308 For instance although RJR retired the famous Joe Camel 
last summer amid mounting public and regulatory pressure, " it is now 
introducing photographs of real animals, which aren 't barred in the 
settlement proposal . A new menagerie for RJR's Winston brand includes a 
304. See Proposed Resolution, supra note 4, at 21-23 (describing steps that the parties will take to alter 
cigarette manufacturers' "corporate culture"). 
305. See generally Hanson & I.,ogue, supra note 3, at 1 3 16- 48 (carefully examining the likely effects 
of the Proposed Resolution). 
306. For a summary of that literature, see id. at 1 1 7-75, 126-8 1 .  
307. See id. at 1 1 68 & n.9. 
308. See Yumiko Ono, Tobacco Ads Seek Glamor Without Camels, Cowboys, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29, 1998, 
at B l .  
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perky, bucktoothed mule and a chubby pig. "309 Perhaps, in light of the Wall 
Street Journal article, legislators will now remember to ban all 
advertisements that include real , perky, bucktoothed mules, but is it realistic 
to expect them to anticipate all of the industry's other countermoves? 
The political reality is that we will only get one bite at the apple of 
comprehensive tobacco reform. It is vitally important, therefore, that any 
reform enacted avoid the pitfalls described above-that it achieve, in other 
words, public health gains without relying on the industry's good faith. The 
Proposed Resolution and its offspring fail this test. Perhaps the broadest yet 
least obvious example of this failure is in the proposed bills' emphasis on 
preventing underage smoking. We are, of course, strongly supportive of any 
efforts to keep children from smoking. Even assuming that the proposed 
strategies would be completely effective,310 however, it remains a significant 
problem in our view that the regulations may do little more than delay by a 
few years the age at which the same number of smokers initiate their habit. 
Supporters and opponents of the Proposed Resolution have argued that 
the trick to preventing people from ever smoking is simply to make certain 
they do not begin smoking before they are eighteen. This theory is based on 
the fact that " [t]he FDA and other health authorities have concluded that 
virtually all new users of tobacco products are under legal age. "31 1  Evidence 
of when smokers start under the current regime, however, reveals little about 
when they would start under the proposed regime. We are quite skeptical 
of, and concerned by, the apparently widely held view that the current 
average age of initiation is somehow predetermined by nature. If one 
assumes, as many industry critics do, that marketing efforts have been 
partially-if not substantially-responsible for encouraging underage consumers 
to start smoking, then one should be seriously concerned that manufacturers 
will woo eighteen-year olds just as they have younger children. If 
manufacturers can successfully target fourteen year-olds, it seems plausible 
that they will be just as successful at targeting eighteen year-olds . 
By directing the bulk of the regulatory firepower on reducing youth 
smoking as a means to achieving significant public health gains, the proposed 
regulations may be squandering a great opportunity. 312 These regulations 
309. Id. (emphasis added). 
3 1 0. We detail in our Yale article the reasons why many of those regulations are unlikely to substantially 
reduce underage smoking. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 3, at 1 322-37. 
3 1 1 .  Proposed Resolution, supra note 4, at I .  
3 1 2. We recognize that there also are a number of provisions designed to increase FDA's authority over 
tobacco products in order to mandate safer cigarettes. As we discuss in Part II supra and explore 
more thoroughly in the Yale article, however, we do not have confidence that command-and-control 
and performance-based regulations alone will have the intended effects. See Hanson & Logue, 
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will not change the industry's strategies, merely their tactics . Cigarette 
manufacturers will continue to produce and market products with the 
minimum possible investment in safety. They will continue efforts to expand 
their markets. They will simply change the demographic target slightly . In 
short, if we don't supplement more directed regulations with a general 
backdrop of ex post incentive-based regulation, we risk frustrating the true 
goals of directed regulations. 313 
In'stead of launching an arms race of regulation and evasion, the 
Smokers' Compensation system gives cigarette manufacturers a stake in 
safety. Instead of relying on regulators in Washington to wheedle 
information out of resistant cigarette manufacturers and then determine what 
are the appropriate investments in safety, the Smokers' Compensation regime 
lets the party with the most information make that decision. As we argued 
above, to regulate effectively using either command-and-control rules or 
performance-based standards, a regulator would need to have much more 
information than any regulator now has or can be expected to have in the 
future. A regulator would need to know, among other things, how to design, 
manufacture, and successfully market less dangerous cigarettes. The reality 
is, however, that the only parties with that type of information are the 
cigarette manufacturers themselves. By forcing the manufacturers to pay for 
the health costs of their cigarettes, Smokers' Compensation gives them an 
incentive to keep those costs low . In the current era of privatization, most 
agree that the market is a powerful force. And no one doubts that market 
forces explain the cigarette industry's basic disregard for public health 
considerations to date . Under a Smokers' Compensation system, 
manufacturer profits would be tied directly to the safety of their cigarettes. 
Unlike any other proposals we have seen, a Smokers' Compensation system 
would harness market forces to align the industry's profit motive and the 
public's interest in health. 
This Article is not meant as a detailed roadmap to a functioning 
Smokers' Compensation system, but simply attempts to lay out some of the 
major considerations and some possible alternatives. There are almost 
. certainly potential problems and potential solutions that we have overlooked. 
We offer this Article not as the last word, but as a contribution to the 
existing literature and to what we hope will become a robust policy 
supra note 3, at 1 322-42. 
3 1 3. As described above, any of the proposed efforts to supplement the leaky command-and-control 
regulations with taxes, fines, or penalties are subject to the same fundamental problem-that is, they 
create no incentive for manufacturers to reduce the public health costs of cigarettes and may actually 
create the opposite incentive. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. 
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discussion regarding how to construct an effective Smokers' Compensation 
system. Given the large number of policy and technical judgments that need 
to be made in order to design and implement Smokers' Compensation, we 
strongly recommend that, if there is to be such a discussion, Congress charge 
a panel (or task force, or commission), composed of members with diverse 
areas of professional and technical expertise and representing a diverse range 
of vantage points, with the task of setting up the system. 
At the very least we hope that this Article will prompt closer scrutiny 
of other tobacco regulation plans and the ways they purport to change 
industry behavior. The current window of opportunity is almost certainly 
short. We should take advantage of it to change the incentives of tobacco 
companies so that, finally, they make the health of their customers a priority. 
